The Viable Thinker

epigraph to impending doom

2011-12-12T14:25:00.001-07:00

I have the feeling that this epigraph should be in a footnote or some other inconspicuous place, hidden under a layer of heady academia. But here it is - feel free to skip ahead if Marta Savigliano was enough to fill your experimental-methods-coffer. Before I begin my analysis of Ukrainian Canadian dance performance, I will forewarn you of some failures in this text. For some unspeakable (un-writable?) reason, I cannot seem to balance my theoretical pursuits with my innate urges toward expressive creativity. When I read my own analysis, I cannot help but hear my own text as something that James Earl Jones would read as a voiceover for Nature on PBS. It fails to convey the excess or the addictive instability I feel when I dance. It fails to take the reader to a place of authenticity - the place where I try and try and try again to find the ethnic experience, only to find static ideology. In the end, I have not decided if this is a fault of my own or of the dances I explicate. Maybe I am drawn to those dances which closely mirror my own inability to expand beyond the scaffolding of stagnant method and contrived expression. For now, I would encourage the reader to accept the following PBS melodrama as my sincere effort to start tackling ideas that are still currently swollen seeds in my brain matter.

** Cue sunrise over the Saharan Desert **

academic moment...

2011-11-13T07:55:00.000-07:00

Based on this micro-example of teen behavior, we see that online social technology becomes an especially tempting exit-strategy for those torn between roles and their associated performance expectations, most notably teens struggling between child and adult roles. With almost unlimited accessibility in the middle-class setting, technological media becomes a performer’s prop or even her background. Regardless of the scene, the performer always has the option of exiting the direct social action and engaging in the mediated, impersonal interaction of this in-between role. For teenagers, this kind of interaction is without the frustration that comes from expectations to fill both child and adult roles in direct engagement. It may come as no wonder that social media is especially popular among American teens.

she cold

2011-10-04T16:39:00.002-06:00

a refrigerator of a woman.

lines, no curves.

broad shoulders, broad hips.

door can be opened -

(it's all about mechanics)

raw, cool air comes out in a flow.

would rather remain shut, thank you very much.

keep the mayo with the eggs

and come during meal times.

almost like a dream

2011-10-02T19:07:00.002-06:00

annual fall fashion musings

2011-09-09T12:18:00.004-06:00

Drumroll please... Announcing La Penseuse's Annual Inspirations for the next Fashion Year. This year will mark the fourth anniversary of this tradition. (And it feels a bit different. Mostly because I live 10 short blocks from NY Fashion Week epicenter aka Lincoln Center...)

(Proof of my convenient location and amateur photo skills)

1. Versatility.

Grunge day, glam night? No problem. (Reading backwards? Sure! Ha. For the sake of ADA protocol, the magazine says "Vogue: Versatile." See also: Zimmerman photo at top.)

2. Japonesque.

Harajuku! Sanrio! Nail art! Butoh!

3. Performativity.

Maybe it's just because I'm getting an MA in this shiz, but Performance Art is making a comeback. (Or hello... Lygia Clark in Vogue? James Franco on General Hospital?! Lady Gaga in general?!!) Check out this cool Tiff&Co window from Fashion's Night Out:

And that's my big three. Live it and love it. Or just love me.

folk dance and technology

2011-08-19T18:51:00.000-06:00

Myth, Art, and Politics: The Relationship of Traditional Dance and Technology

Traditional dance is a particularly unique form of performative language. It evolves from participatory to presentational, mythic to artistic. Moreover, traditional dance has a potent and volatile relationship with technology. History shows us that technology challenges the roots and endurance of cultural dance forms. The “social realism” movement of the early Soviet Union evidences the potentially negative effects of technology on performance: the Soviet political technology transformed the fundamental style of Ukrainian folk dance—a style that endures as a somewhat contrived cultural form. However, technology is not inherently corrupt. Community balances technology. Dance that embodies collective expression keeps technological infiltration in check.

Traditional Dance: Technique and Techné

When discussing the variation of traditional dance that is “folk dance,” we must first define the term. Felix Hoerburger notes that dancers and choreographers alike use the label liberally to describe a wide variety of dance styles (1968, 29). However, we will utilize the definition that Hoerburger applies to his account of folk dance in its “first existence.” First existence folk dance is the original form of the style, set apart by three distinct characteristics: (1) it is an integral part of community life, (2) the choreography is changeable, and (3) community members learn it in a natural, unspoken manner (30-31). When we refer to folk dance, we refer to the style that global communities still develop and perform. Folk dance remains a dynamic mode of expression, inherent to a culture as its customs or traditions. Folk dance participants do not perform with a rigid or codified technique. Rather, they perform with an implicit understanding of the technique and its fluid nature.

One of the most pertinent current examples of the original folk style is the social dance performed at Eastern European weddings. In Poland, Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, wedding dances have remained an integral aspect of the marriage ritual. Many weddings include a series of dances (circle dances for the bridesmaids, couples dances for the bride and groom, etc.) (Kennedy 1925, Nahachewsky 2002), but nearly all include participatory chain dances. The chain dance is one in which every wedding guest can participate, with a typically simple and repetitive sequence. Even so, most guests likely know the sequence by heart, having grown up with the dance as an ordinary ritual of community life. Indeed, we know that chain-style social dance is among the oldest of European forms (Rice 2000, 164). The continued performance and development of this kind of Eastern European wedding dance is a testimony to its classification as original folk dance.

In general, social dances like the European wedding dance example fall neatly into the category of participatory dance. The formal characteristics of folk dance are therefore equivalent to those of the philosophic dialectic. Just as Plato illustrates in Gorgias, the dialectic is a conversational style of language (Jowett 4). In the same way, folk dance participants “speak” to each other conversationally. In the case of the chain dance, each dancer contributes to the conversation either by following the sequence or, if at the head of the chain, by initiating step variation. Moreover, the folk dance language is simple and repetitive like that of the humble Socrates. Unlike charismatic Gorgias, Socrates directs the conversation in a natural way. And just like the philosopher’s words, folk dance steps are markedly ordinary. Lee Franklin notes that such is a key trait of the dialectic: “Dialectic begins in our ordinary ability to speak and think about the world” (2001, 413). However, the ordinary language of the dialectic has the capacity to develop philosophically. Likewise, ordinary folk dance steps display a gradual evolution. The steps of a particular chain dance progress mid-performance as the dancers respond to the direction of the chain leader. In a broader sense, the chain style itself changes as the community environment evolves. The dialectic communicates its truth in subtle progression; folk dance technique develops comparably.

Like the dialectic, the function of folk dance is dynamic. The symbolic communication is fluid and changeable. As the form adapts to its environment, the technique experiences gradual changes. In this sense, the technique is not “technical.” Rather, it is a manifestation of techné. Martin Heidegger explains this term in its original Greek context: “Thus, what is decisive in techné does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing” (1977, 13). When technique is technical, it manipulates means to establish ends. When technique is techné, it works in harmony with its surroundings to “reveal” ends. Unlike presentational dance, folk dance technique is not fixed to achieve a certain appearance. It gradually reveals its technique in accordance to the dynamics of its environment. In this way, the dialectical form also functions mythically. Ernst Cassirer describes mythic symbolism: “Myth is not a system of dogmatic creeds. […] Even if we should succeed in analyzing myth into ultimate conceptual elements, we could, by such an analytical process, never grasp its vital principle, which is a dynamic not a static one” (105, italics added).

While primitive traditional dance operates as foundational lingual symbolism, folk dance operates as its near relative: mythic symbolism. The participatory nature of folk dance displays fundamental characteristics of mythic experience, which is the collective symbolic expression of feeling resulting from shared belief (Verene 110, Cassirer 108). The social dance at the Eastern European wedding is a collective symbolic expression of the shared belief about the marriage ceremony. Indeed, Cassirer goes on to write that the “real substratum of myth is not a substratum of thought but of feeling” and that the unity of this feeling “is one of the strongest and most profound impulses of primitive thought” (108). The shared feelings born of the participatory/dialectal style evidences its mythic function. And like myth, the style’s technique is one of techné, continually changing and adapting to its environment.

Acknowledging this, we can expect the folk dance style to evolve into more developed forms. As traditional dance continues to evolve, several new variations emerge from the original folk style. Hughes describes the process: “Folk dance is the folk dancing, and you will not see it until you travel to a community of its birth. The folk dance you see on the stage has already made the transition into art dance, for it has become dance to be seen” (1977, 3-4). The techné properties of folk dance technique drive this kind of change, and both its dialectical form and mythic function naturally evolve. The development of folk technique “reveals” the folk-stage style.

We can view folk-stage dance as an example of Hoerburger’s account of folk dance in its “second existence”, or the consciously cultivated version of the form (31). In simpler terms, folk-stage dance is literally the staged form of the original folk style. It is also the transformation of the participatory to the presentational form. Folk-stage dance is thus equivalent to the form of rhetorical language. It speaks to a crowd in an appealing and charismatic manner. The steps are less the ordinary folk fashion and more the visually stunning technique of theatrical performance. Like an effective rhetorical speech, the aesthetic qualities of the performance are essential to its delivery.

The fundamental aesthetic quality of folk-stage dance indicates that it functions like the symbolic form of art. Certainly, the artistic nature of the style is obvious. Folk-stage dancing is a depiction of beauty, which Cassirer points to as “one of the most clearly known of human phenomena” (176). Furthermore, the artistic function logically follows the progression of symbolic form. Folk dance generates folk-stage dance in the same manner that myth generates art. If myth is that primal reaction to nature, art “must come to the aid of nature and actually correct or perfect it” (Cassirer 179). Through the process of techné, mythic dance becomes artistic. Samuel Weber evidences this claim: “In this sense, techné is a form of poéisis [bringing forth] that which is closely related to art” (1989, 5).

However, when the techné of traditional dance becomes artistic, its symbolism may begin to acquire new characteristic tendencies. Cassirer asserts that art oscillates between “an objective and a subjective pole” (177). Art seeks to balance the process of creativity with the process of mechanical reproduction. Without a certain level of codified technique, art cannot achieve its desired levels of aestheticism. On the other hand, the over-instrumentation of technique reduces the form to robotic imitation. Consequently, the artistic symbolic function of folk-stage dance treads the fine line between manifestation of techné and mere technical performance.

Nationalist Dance and Political Technology

With the conception of the folk-stage form around the nineteenth century, traditional dance develops as an especially potent symbol of national and ethnic identity (Reed 1998, 510). The communal origins of traditional dance offer ample explanation for the adoption of dance as a means of group identity. However, what sets folk and folk-stage styles apart is the adoption of the latter as a means of political identity. With the rise of nationalism comes the rise of the “folk,” which governments efficiently propagate through traditional dance performance. In the hands of political institutions, Reed claims, dance becomes “a powerful tool in shaping ideology and in the creation of national subjects, often more so than are political rhetoric or intellectual debates” (511). A sub-form of the folk-stage style proliferates, which we will label as nationalist dance.

If political dance is as powerful as or more powerful than political rhetoric, it is undoubtedly because national dance is of the form of rhetoric. Like all folk-stage dances, nationalist dance is presentational and thus rhetorical. However, this political variation appears to be a uniquely powerful form of rhetoric, one that sends its message more efficiently and effectively than other staged forms. Irene Loutzaki describes Greece’s explicit attempt to “impose on dance an intensive and strong political character” during the mid-twentieth century (2001, 127). Reed also cites historical instances of the effective political instrumentation of folk dance, including examples from China, Cuba, and Haiti (511-512). What about the nationalist dance makes its rhetoric so effective? Its form of language is not inherently different from other folk-stage styles. The difference must lie in its symbolic function.

We have established that folk dance functions like the symbolic form of myth and the folk-stage style like art. It seems that nationalist dance, as a sub-style of folk-stage, would also function as an aesthetic symbol. However, acknowledging Cassirer’s description of the aesthetic experience, we immediately see a key difference. He tells us that genuine beauty cannot be forced upon our minds. Rather, it is a mutual experience: “In order to feel it, one must cooperate with the artist” (206). In certain nationalist styles, the feelings that a dance produces are just as instrumental as the technique. The feelings are not natural, but coerced and contrived. The style may function as political technology rather than artistic technique.

Once political technology (i.e. political ideology) replaces the techné of traditional dance, the symbolic function of dance is dramatically altered. The Soviet transformation of the Central Ukrainian or Cossack folk dances is a particularly potent example of politicized traditional dance.

Soviet-Ukrainian Dance as Performance of Ideology

When the Soviet Union adopted its constitution in 1924, the state reorganized itself into a multinational federation. When a new constitution was adopted twelve years later, the union became officially comprised of eleven Soviet republics, each possessing a number of ethnicities and cultures. During this time, the Kremlin utilized its newfound cultural diversity to experiment in the field of “virtual tourism” (Hirsch 2003). [1]Within a decade, the Soviet government had commissioned an impressive number of curators, choreographers, and composers to develop the Soviet folk arts. The Kremlin ceaselessly claimed that the folk arts program was an effort to grant equality to each Soviet nation, and that the smaller republics “found warm encouragement for their self-development” (Swift 1968, 158). But Swift points out, “It was understood, however, that the culture was to be developed according to the pattern advocated by Stalin in 1930: ‘Socialist in content, national in form’” (158). Folk dance became an incredibly effective way to accomplish the Soviet political agenda. National dance troupes could portray that cultural “self-development” so integral to the new constitution, while also depicting the superior Soviet way of life. Moreover, “In the USSR, the state [had] the means to control the production of every ballet and every other stage performance, not only by negatively condemning some, but also by positively commissioning other to be done” (163).

One such “positively commissioned” production was the State Folk Dance Ensemble of the Ukrainian SSR . At the time of its formation in 1937, Ukrainian dance had already experienced a folk-stage revival—Vasyl Verkhovynets, ballet master and musicologist, transformed the central Ukrainian style into an iconic national form when he choreographed hopak (Shatulsky 1980). The already technical form was a natural selection for Soviet cultivation. Under Soviet oversight, the dance form acquired an even more technical nature. The central Ukrainian style became synonymous with all Ukrainian styles, and the overall technique more balletic. In fact, the State Folk Dance Ensemble became like any other specialized “national ballet” troupe which the Kremlin produced specifically as “a convenient focal point from which to examine the type of original ballet that the government and Party encouraged among [its] national groups” (Swift 162). As such, the Ensemble’s technical performances displayed those same themes of peasant revolution, satisfied proletariat workers, and scientific progress as its co-contemporary, the Russian Ballet. The political messages were undeniably far from subliminal—one commissioned production depicted an ancient political friendship between Russia and Ukraine; hardly a realistic theme (168). In the end, the effect of this Soviet development was lasting. Outside of several simple participatory dances (including the Ukrainian wedding dances), few entirely traditional dances remain today. The most well-known Ukrainian folk dances have roots in the balletic stylizations of central Ukrainian forms (Shatulsky 88).

Under Soviet rule, the national dance of Ukraine was unquestionably technological. More specifically, the language of the dance functioned ideologically. (Technology itself is the use of instrumentation to increase the efficiency of achieving ends; the technology of political ideology an especially potent form.) Brent Gilchrist defines ideology as “a belief system, involving sets of ideas that explain the world, particularly the political environment, and that justifies responses to it, specifically political action” (2006, 35). Ideology instruments belief into action, efficiently converting powerful feelings into quantifiable results. More specifically, successful ideology utilizes language to communicate “practical ideas that respond to felt needs” (37).

The language does not create the feeling; it is the feeling. The political rhetoric is the embodiment of the ideology. We see that technology, and ideology especially, has a tendency to replace means as ends, function as form. Just so, the technological function of Ukrainian dance rhetoric became the purpose of the performance. The function of rhetoric as technological means replaces its ends, the form of language itself. Heideggar describes technology in terms of this corruption of language: techné “reveals” (12); technology “challenges” (14). When the function of language attains this new nature, it necessarily alters the nature of the symbolic forms that emerge. Indeed, Cassirer asserts in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, “Through the particularity of the linguistic function, we perceive the universal symbolic function, as it unfolds in accordance with immanent laws, in art, in the mythical-religious consciousness, in language and in cognition” (1955, 186). Again, when the linguistic function no longer “unfolds” but “challenges,” like the coercive rhetoric of ideology, the resulting language cannot retain its poetic form. Instead, it is simply an efficient imitation of poéisis that cannot naturally bring forth those symbolic forms which would have otherwise emerged in the poetic fashion of techné. The forms that do emerge are shadows of the originals. The technological function of political ideology corrupts the mythic and artistic symbolism in dance.

The original Ukrainian mythic dances could not have been those proletariat depictions of the Ukrainian State Ensemble. Nevertheless, like most Slavic nations, the cultural myth of Ukraine was deeply rooted in the rural peasantry (Scheffel and Kandert 1994). The proletariat worker of Soviet ideology was a convenient interpretation of the mythic Slavic people. In the efficient hands of ideology, the mythic symbolism of traditional Ukrainian dance was easily politicized. This transformation is a near perfect manifestation of Cassirer’s description of the modern political myth: “While the soil for the Myth of the Twentieth Century had been prepared long before, it could not have born its fruit without the skilful use of the new technical tool” (1961, 277). The union of Ukrainian myth and Soviet technology produced a political myth that retained the authentic form but functioned in a singularly efficient way. The mythic feelings of unity became those of volatile nationalism. The mythic terms like “folk” or “people” became propagandist references to socialist identity. Cassirer affirms, “Our ordinary words are charged with meanings; but these new-fangled words are charged with feelings and violent passions” (283). Language expresses the calculated politico-mythic feeling, further evidence of political myth’s roots in corrupt language. But it is feeling without authentic symbolic meaning. Corrupt language produces corrupt myth, which cannot produce authentic art.

Johann Gottfried Herder, a philosopher of considerable influence on the work of Cassirer, discusses the significance of authentic myth and art. He points out that we utilize the authentic form of myth “for the sake of sensuous beauty” as a foundation for “beautifully poetic ends”(Menze and Menges 216-217). The beauty of authentic art, however, cannot emerge from corrupt myth. The Soviet dance art was just as politically codified as the dance language and myth. Moreover, the Soviet arts were explicitly so. Swift recounts, “On October 26, 1932, […] Joseph Stalin coined one of the most artistically lethal terms of all time: ‘socialist realism’” (92). Socialist realism was the officially imposed function of art, a comprehensive aesthetic standard to which every artistic work was subject. All national dance production was only aesthetic to the degree that it remained an ideologically “truthful” portrayal of socialist life. Consequently, the dance choreographies became repetitive and the national styles more similar to one another (Swift 158-203). The once colorful folk arts became mediocre reproductions of one another. Herder laments this kind of demise, exclaiming, “He, who has nothing of his own store, who merely repeats, is not only a mediocre mind, but a wretched one” (216-217). The incredibly technical performances of the Ukrainian State Ensemble are surprisingly empty to watch. Like that of political myth, the feeling is powerful but superficial. The artistic symbolism of Soviet folk-stage dance developed as artifice in the place of art.

The purpose of the Ukrainian nationalist style was not to achieve the ends of enlightened truth, but to replace those ends with technological means.[2] Without the function of techné, the presentational performance language acquired those subjective tendencies outlined previously by Cassirer and its artistic symbolism could not balance the aesthetic with the technological. When traditional dance lacks the ability to balance mythic/artistic symbolism with technology, the movement becomes a mechanical reproduction. If the technological function is also ideological, the symbolic forms that emerge may be corrupt. While rhetoric may not be a “bad” form, it seems an inferior one. Rhetoric has the potential to be technologically corrupt. Just as Plato illustrates, it lacks the dialectic’s ability to properly balance the subjective and the objective. The result may be sophistry, even corruption.

Yet, we cannot claim that the form of rhetoric is corrupt in the first place. Folk-stage dance is not inherently corrupt because of its presentational form. But now we have a contradiction—would not rhetoric be a corrupt form of language if it develops a corrupt symbolic function? The answer lies in understanding the form of technology. Must rhetoric immanently succumb to technological corruption? Can certain forms of rhetoric withstand infiltration? Can folk-stage dance, especially nationalist dance forms, avoid technological demise?

Balancing Performance and Technology

Ukrainian traditional dance experienced the near full effect of technological corruption during the Soviet era. We may even go as far to say that the communist regime essentially replaced the first existence folk dances with the second existence staged styles. Moreover, the staged styles were hollow performances, devoid of authentic mythic and artistic symbolism. The corruption stemmed from the technology which was ideology. Ideology infiltrated the dance language, which then permeated its symbolic functions. We noted that Ukrainian dance still displays the effects of this corruption—the most iconic traditional dances have roots in the politically choreographed styles. However, is it fair to conclude that Ukrainian dance is permanently corrupt? Has the instrumented technique remained a subjective function of the technological rhetoric? The Canadian Ukrainian Diaspora dances may answer these questions as a potential stage of traditional dance evolution beyond an ideological form.

In the 1960s, Ukrainian dance experienced yet another kind of revival in western Canada (Nahachewsky 2001, 19). The heavily choreographed and Soviet-influenced styles became part of a distinctly non-Soviet culture. The second existence stage forms seem to have regressed to another first existence. Nahachewsky describes one dance in particular:

The motifs for this dance were clearly from second existence stage dances and performed by trained revivalist dancers, but this kolomyika was performed in a participatory context. Participants improvised in terms of who stepped into the circle to perform these fancy steps, and in what order they were performed. Elements of stage dance had "descended" back down from the proscenium to become part of social dance again in a new dance form. (19)

From its presentational roots, Ukrainian dance language became once again participatory or dialectical in form. On the other hand, these participatory dances retained aspects of their rhetorical form and technological function. They had been consciously revived by technically-trained experts and presented with that same Soviet-imposed technique. Nonetheless, the natural mythic feelings of unity seem to have been present—the symbolic form was not corrupt. Is this style a separate genre from the folk and folk-stage forms? Nahachewsky questions whether this may constitute a “third existence” of traditional dance (19). If so, this form may reveal a dance language that is fundamentally rhetorical, but less susceptible to the technology that may otherwise corrupt its symbolism.

Canadian Ukrainian dance originated from a largely “corrupt” branch of the nationalist genre, but functioned both technologically and authentically. The dance language maintained its technological-nationalist roots, but “spoke” objectively. Technology was a means of the language, but had not infiltrated its ends. The performance language remained incorrupt. What kind of rhetoric is this that can withstand technological infiltration and thus preserve its authentic symbolism?

Collective Expression and Embodiment

To better understand the performative qualities of traditional dance thus far, we have used the rhetoric/dialect dichotomy. Charles Taylor introduces another philosophic dichotomy of language in his work on the subject in relation to human nature (1978). He claims that language can be separated according to a designative or expressive nature. Designative language is that which allocates signs (i.e. words) to objects in order to describe them or any relations involving them (5). Expressive language is that which directly “manifests” something—Taylor points to the example of human emotion or feeling (6). Unlike our previous language dichotomy, Taylor’s dichotomy is one of function. Accordingly, we cannot neatly ascribe to it the presentational/participatory distinction. However, he affirms that language can be taken “in a wide sense, to include the whole range of meaningful media, […] for man is also characterized by the creation of music, art, dance, by the whole range of ‘symbolic forms,’ to use Cassirer’s phrase” (3). Taylor’s dichotomy does not just apply to the spoken word; we can confidently apply it to our analysis of performative dance language.

The designative classification is the most rational explanation of language. Man uses simple signs to form complex sentences, which then indirectly describe an event, object, or feeling. Designative dance language would be one that assembles separate symbolic gestures to create its message. The technique would be of vital import, as each movement represents a separate idea. The ends of designative language are not in language itself, but rather in the means of assembling these separate ideas. Its function is plainly technological. Consequently, language becomes an unstable, even dangerous tool. Taylor affirms:

From this role of language we can see why words are so dangerous. If we use them to marshal ideas, they must be transparent. We must be able to see clearly what the word designates. Otherwise where we think we are assembling our ideas to match the real, we will in fact be building castles of illusion or composing absurdities. Our instruments will have taken over, and instead of controlling we shall be controlled. (17)

Rhetoric like that of Gorgias or Soviet dance is wholly designative to the degree of sophistry or corruption. The language has no value beyond its individual parts, and is therefore completely subject to them. When the parts are corrupt, the whole must be also. Designative rhetoric cannot withstand technological corruption.

In contrast, expressive language operates holistically. “Expression makes something manifest in embodying it” rather than assembling a whole made of separate symbolic units (Taylor 7). In this way, the expressive explanation of language is less rational and infinitely more enigmatic than that of designative. However, Taylor claims that the most fundamental characteristic of language may be expressive meaning (8). In Vico’s mythic account, language first emerged as emotional expression. Before man designated signs to objects, he reacted to them expressively. Dance, too, emerged expressively before it became a collection of technical movements. Taylor states, “The expressive dimension is fundamental to language, because it is only in expression that language comes to be” (21). Unlike designative language, the ends of expressive language are in the whole of language itself. The words or separate units of symbolism are merely a means toward the whole of symbolic manifestation. Taylor concludes that “it seems that we need the whole of language as the background for the introduction of its parts” (22).

The symbolic movements of traditional dance do not create the symbolic whole; instead, the symbolic whole inspires the expressive movement. For example, folk dance’s mythic or artistic feelings do not come from the sum of its movements, but rather, the movements are the realization of feelings already present in the folk community. We see that unlike the individualist nature of designation, expression is inherently communal. Taylor goes on to assert that the crucial activities of expression are those of the community (36). When we express something, whether it be through the means of spoken word or dance movement, our ends are in the language of a community. Jacques Rancière adds that such is a “shared power of the equality of intelligence” that “links individuals” and “makes them exchange their intellectual adventures” (17).

This may explain the Canadian Ukrainian dance phenomenon. Although composed of technological, even ideological movement, the ends of the dance were not contained in the movement. On the contrary, the ends of the dance were already present in the shared underlying values and feelings of the community, and the technological movements were simply the means of manifesting it. The technological-rhetorical origins of the style were kept at bay by the expression of the community. The sensus communis of the Canadian Ukrainian people prevented the infiltration of the technology of Soviet Ukrainian ideology.

Expressive rhetoric can withstand technological infiltration. Expression maintains the sensus communis associated with authentic language, which can then offset the potential corruption of technology. When traditional dance is the symbolic expression of a people, rather than the technological designation of an individual or an institution, it retains the authentic functions of primordial language and the resulting symbolic forms. Thus, authentic dance language may be manifest either participatorily or presentationally. The dialectical form of folk dance and the rhetorical form of folk-stage dance both remain authentic when they are expressions of the people they represent. While the rhetorical form may be prone to designative tendencies because of its one-sided nature, it can withstand corruption by expressing the needs and utilities of its community. Subsequently, community balances technology.

Traditional dance is thus emancipated from its subjective tendencies, creating an objective and collective whole. In the words of Rancière, “That is what the word ‘emancipation’ means: the blurring of the boundary between those who act and those who look; between individuals and members of a collective body” (19). When traditional dance originates in such a community, it naturally evolves as objective symbolism by balancing the subjective function of technology. The function of communal expression is thus equivalent to the function of dialectical form. Accordingly, expressive language must also be a manifestation of techné, naturally revealing foundational truth.

References

Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.

Cassirer, Ernst. The Myth of the State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946.

Cassirer, Ernst. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.

Franklin, Lee. “The Structure of Dialectic in the ‘Meno’.” Phronesis 46, no. 4 (November 2001): 413-39.

Gilchrist, Brent. Cultus Americanus: Varieties of the Liberal Tradition in American Political Culture, 1600-1865. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006.

Heidegger, Martin. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977.

Herder, Johann Gottfried. Selected Early Works, 1764-1767. Edited by Ernest A. Menze and Karl Menges. Translated by Ernest A. Menze and Michael Palma. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.

Hirsch, Francine. “Getting to Know ‘The Peoples of the USSR’: Ethnographic Exhibits of Soviet Virtual Tourism.” Slavic Review 62, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 683-709.

Hoerburger, Felix. “Once Again: On the Concept of ‘Folk Dance’.” Journals of the International Folk Music Council 20 (1968): 30-32.

Hughes, Russell Meriwether. Total Education in Ethnic Dance. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1977.

Kennedy, H.E. “Polish Peasant Courtship and Wedding Customs and Folk-Song.” Folklore 36, no. 1 (March 1925): 48-68. .

Loutzaki, Irene. “Folk Dance in Political Rhythms.” Yearbook for Traditional Music 33 (2001): 127-37.

Nahachewsky, Andriy. “New Ethnicity and Ukrainian Canadian Social Dances.” The Journal of American Folklore 115, no. 456 (Spring 2002): 175-90..

Nahachewsky, Andriy. “Participatory and Presentational Dance as Ethnochoreological Categories.” Dance Research Journal 27, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 1-15.

Nahachewsky, Andriy. “Once Again: On the Concept of ‘Second Existence Folk Dance’.” Yearbook for Traditional Music 33 (2001): 17-28.

Parker-Starbuck, Jennifer. “Framing the Fragments: The Wooster Group’s Use of Technology,” in The Wooster Group and Its Traditions. Edited by Johan Callens. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005.

Plato. Gorgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. .

Rancière, Jacques. The Emancipated Spectator. Translated by Gregory Elliot. London: Verso, 2009.

Reed, Susan A. “The Politics and Poetics of Dance.” Annual Review of Anthropology 27 (1998): 503-32.

Rice, Timothy. “Dance in Europe,” in The Garland Encyclopedia of World Music. Edited by Timothy Rice, James Porter, and Chris Goertzen. Vol. 8, New York: Garland Publishing, 2000.

Shatulsky, Myron. The Ukrainian Folk Dance. Toronto, ON: Kobzar Publishing, 1980.

Swift, Mary Grace. The Art of the Dance in the U.S.S.R. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1968.

Taylor, Charles. "Language and Human Nature." Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lecture. Ottawa: Carleton University, 1978.

Verene, Donald Phillip. Speculative Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009.

Weber, Samuel. “Upsetting the Set Up: Remarks on Heidegger’s Questing after Technics.” MLN 104, no. 5 (December 1989): 977-92.

[1] It may be possible to analyze this experimentation as an example of primitive “cyborg theatre,” as it aligns closely with Jennifer Parker-Starbuck and Donna Haraway’s description of the “mutual constitution between myth and tool” (Parker-Starbuck 221).

[2] Tying in the previous example from Plato, the rhetoric of Gorgias had no end in philosophic truth. Socrates notes that “the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know” (13, italics added). The rhetorician’s “way” of persuasive language is also the purpose of his argument.

parts 2 and 3

2011-08-18T21:59:00.000-06:00

Part II: Question and Answer[1]

1. Why is disembodiment synonymous with Death?

A body distinct from the mind lacks consciousness and agency. In this scenario, I maintain that the body is like a machine. But perhaps we can go further. As yet human, our isolated bodies are more like corpses, retaining the form of a live body but lacking that force which constitutes Living. Connection is Living, separation is Death. Roland Barthes illustrates this point in his 1968 essay, “The Death of the Author.”[2] He writes:

As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death…[3] (Italics added)

Action that is a product of direct relationship between agency and motion is the Living action. In this case, the direct relationship between the mind’s decision to write and the body’s simultaneous action of writing captures the author’s voice – the Living quality of literature. We may conclude that action that is a product of the indirect relationship of mind and body is the Dead action. The writing that exists as a symbol of an action is merely the relic of the author’s agency. In terms of movement, actions that embody thought display a direct relationship between mind and body. These actions are alive and the bodies that perform them are Living. In contrast, actions that are merely representations of the mind’s previous thoughts or directions are Dead, devoid of the mind’s presence. Only empty bodies remain after the mind’s flight, and the actions or movements are ghosts of what used to be. The movement exercise of “Ghosting Yourself” is an especially potent example of this idea.[4] Meg Stuart instructs us to create a movement that is both physical and emotional. After a process of deconstruction, the movement becomes a ghost of the original action. In this exercise, we sense the transition of Living to Dead. The movement becomes empty motion, the body a carcass.

2. How do we define space-creating movement?

As evidenced by Gil, space-creating movement is the key to realizing the Body. Moreover, space-creation is characterized by self-awareness and relationship with others. Gil points specifically to dance movement: “Dance operates as a kind of pure experimentation with the body’s capacity to assemble, thus creating a laboratory where all possible assemblages are tested.”[5] Accordingly, space-creating movement is assemblage; dance a method of assembling. Gil continues: “Dance not only puts the body in motion by assembling its limbs […], but dance enchains this motioning over the pure vital movement the body shelters.”[6] Dance becomes an assembler of assemblages, the Flesh that connects organs to a body and bodies to other bodies – a true force of totality. In turn, total assemblage transcends the barrier of skin. Flesh is also space.

However, Gil’s conclusion leads us to question: can other movement forms generate this force of assemblage? Elizabeth Grosz echoes Merleau-Ponty on the matter, writing that the force of Flesh depends on “bodily situation.”[7] Again, according to Merleau-Ponty, we can look at the body as an egg filled with and driven by endless, swirling velocities. If the body is situated in such a way that dilates the velocities, the forces may extend beyond the skin, becoming (and thus, creating) space.[8] Furthermore, if the body can produce such a situation, it can also make space independent of any singularly defined way of movement. The movement may be balletic, hypnotic, organic, codified – as long it allows the body to dilate its velocities. In other words, the movement must be performative:

The performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata […] And these open vortexes in the sonorous world finally form one sole vortex in which the ideas fit in with one another.[9] (Italics added)

Merleau-Ponty shows us that performance is the medium of movement that dilates velocities or “opens vortexes.” In this case, the moving body is the musician rather than the dancer. However, like Gil’s dancer, the musician-performer embodies himself, allowing him to transcend his body-proper.

Part III: Conclusion and Questions for Further Discussion[10]

In contrast to the paradigms of Enlightenment thinking, “postmodern” texts evidence that both mind and body exist as a greater whole. We as individuals may realize this greater whole by engaging in performative movement. Ultimately, individual transcendence leads to collective connection and society becomes a single Flesh rather than a disjointed organism. Embodiment and subsequent realization of the Flesh is thus a preferable existence – it appears an antidote to the alienation and ennui of Cartesian thinking.

Nevertheless, like the swirling velocities within the egg-body, our new paradigm is dynamic and speculative. Keeping in mind the experimental and changing nature of postmodern thinking itself, it seems more appropriate to conclude my text with a series of new questions to investigate:

- Is the (collective) Body a gendered body??

- My obvious Marxist terminology aside, which political regime best suits the Body?

- How are live movement and political participation connected?

- What role does communitas play in the creation of a Body without Organs?

- How can performers extend themselves to influence the ideologies and methods of other academic disciplines?

Bibliography

Austen, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1962.

Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980.

Bishop, Claire. Participation: Documents of Contemporary Art. “Roland Barthes: The Death of the Author (1968).” London: MIT Press, 2006.

Capra, Fritjof. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising of Culture. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” London: University of Minnesota, 1987.

Felman, Shoshana. The Scandal of the Speaking Body. Stanford: Stanford University, 1980.

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. “Docile Bodies.” New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

Gil, José. “Paradoxical Body.” TDR. Winter 2006: 21-35.

Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Indianapolis: Indiana University, 1994.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Visible and the Invisible. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1968.

Stuart, Meg. Are We Here Yet? “Exercises.” 2010.

[1] I will utilize a question-answer format to explain important themes and terminology from my sermon. I realize that my terminology thus far may be vague or confusing – I intend it to be this way. In the vogue of J. L. Austen, I find that overlapping or inconsistent terminology adds to the performative quality of my writing, illustrating the nature of performative speech itself. In the end, this appendix may only be useful for my own understanding – after all, “there is a fundamental narcissism in all vision” (Merleau-Ponty, 139). J

[2] Bishop, Claire. Participation: Documents of Contemporary Art. “Roland Barthes: The Death of the Author (1968).” (London: MIT Press, 2006) 41.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Stuart, Meg. Are We Here Yet? “Exercises.” (2010) 159-160.

[5] Gil, 30.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Grosz. 91.

[8] Grosz. 91.

[9] Merleau-Ponty. 151.

[10] These are questions that went beyond the scope of my essay. If I had more time, I would certainly address these. I find Elizabeth Grosz particularly insightful on these subjects.

part 1

2011-08-15T23:04:00.000-06:00

10:45 AM Service: Life is Not a Body

For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body…

-1 Corinthians 12:12

Part I: Sermon

They tell us that Life is Not a Body. Dear ones, They would have us believe that we are boxes. They would have us believe that we are hollow. Filled only with ghosts. Filled with Death. But why would They have us believe in theories of misery and isolation? Are not we all in pursuit of happier existence? I tell you that we must be. They have no reason to speak if we exist truly as tombs. We learn opposition in all things. And let us learn.

We read that It “made mind more certain for him than matter and led him to the conclusion that the two were separate and fundamentally different.”[1] Descartes, figurehead of enlightenment, proclaims his Cogito. Listening intently, They birth a Western worldview. Now, bodies and minds are different mediums. The mind rules the body, and the body is a machine. The body/machine works for the mind. (They are the mind.) In turn, Modernity rules the mind, powered by the steam produced by an assembly line of factory bodies. Slaves to Modernity, They tell us that we have no mind. Foucault calls us docile: the working bodies accept their purpose.[2] Sweet compliance, devoid of the questioning intellect, fuels a compelling change. They call it Revolution. But I ask you: what kind of Revolution is this? And I tell you: it is not Revolution. It is evolution. The Cogito virus proliferates exponentially, changing the state of bodily existence outside of bodily jurisdiction. Disembodiment is rampant and They tell us that Life is Not a Body.

We, tamed and tender, know this is truth. We, infected and fragile, dare not avert our eyes from the conveyer belt. But if we would only look away! Look! Look!

What there is then are not things first identical with themselves, which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them – but something to which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could not dream of seeing “all naked” because the gaze itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh.[3] (Italics added)

Amen. Look at the bodies around you. We share the same Flesh; a Flesh that connects us. We see that we are more than cogs in the punch-clock. “Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world.” If we see other bodies, we can touch them. Or rather, seeing is touching. We sense that our (collective) bodies are alive and they are one: Life is A Body. But, dear ones, we do not look. We live in the Flesh, but remain disembodied. We look without seeing; move without meaning. The opponent attacks. You cannot move your own body! You are part of the machine!

Let us describe the machine. We talk of assembly lines and conveyor belts, but let us delve further. The machine is made of parts. Insignificant and powerless on their own, the parts are equally reliant on the system as they are useful to it. The Cartesian paradigm ensures that each part remains distinct from its counterpart. The machine is resolutely preconfigured. The parts do not touch. (Thus, as Merleau-Ponty affirms, the parts do not see.) The parts create a whole, but not a collectivity. The whole is an organism, not a body. Artaud notes the difference: “The body is the body. Alone it stands. And in no need of organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are the enemies of the body.”[4] The machine is an organism, a system of organs/parts/workers that creates a whole unable to transcend the mediocre sum of itself. Thus, it remains subject to the mind – the only medium capable of transcendence within the Cartesian framework.[5]

Thus, our goal is bodily transcendence. We must elevate the body to meet the mind’s eye, overcoming the blindness that prevents our own unity. They know we are Flesh, which is why They keep us in cubicles. They know that the body can touch/see as the mind’s equal. They know that connected bodies can revolt. What They do not know is that our cubicle walls are as the membranes of a cell – osmotic and porous. At last, the truth: we CAN move our own bodies. While perhaps we lack consciousness of it, our capacity to move is far greater than They (themselves subjects King Cogito) would have us believe. Indeed, our bodies are both “immanent and transcendent.”[6] For as much as we are solid, we are equally as fluid:

Subatomic units of matter are very abstract entities which have dual aspect. Depending on how we look at them, they appear sometimes as particles, sometimes as waves; and this dual nature is also exhibited by light, which can take the form of electromagnetic waves or particles.[7]

I give you the Heisenberg Principle. (Hallelujah!) Mind cannot deny the duality of matter. Mind cannot deny the capabilities of Flesh. Flesh is the double-edged sword, creating space through power of presence (solidity) and meaning of movement (fluidity).

Now, we ask, how can we realize the Flesh? How do we discover that movement which transcends our body beyond partial existence? How can we express both the solidity and fluidity of the transcendent Body? Deleuze and Guattari describe the desirability of this holistic Body (the Body without Organs), but fail to give us clear direction. Surely there is a better path to obtaining the Body than that of experimentation with masochism, drugs, or hypochondria.[8] And indeed, José Gil offers us a method. The answer lies in the creation of space through movement.

“We know that the dancer evolves in a particular space, different from objective space. The dancer does not move in space, rather, the dancer secretes, creates space with his movement.”[9] The space in which the transcendent body exists is one that is self-defined. They call us a box and put us in a box. But we make ourselves a sphere. Or a plane. Or a tetrahedron with corners sharp enough to pierce cellular walls. Bodily forces create new spaces that kiss, overlap, or run parallel to one another. In each case, the spaces are intrinsically self-conscious:

Although invisible, the space, the air, acquire a diversity of textures—they become dense or rarified, invigorating or suffocating. It is as if they were enveloping things with a surface similar to the skin. The space of the body is the skin extending itself into space; it is skin becoming space—thus, the extreme proximity between things and the body.[10]

Self-created space is aware of itself and others, becoming space only through relationship with others. We create space through Flesh. We acknowledge our collective Flesh – we touch and see one another in this space. We realize the Flesh through space-creating movement, and consequently realize our own connectivity. Once connected, our own holistic bodies compose a single holistic Body that stands apart from organism or machine.[11]

A reiteration of faith: we believe that Life is a Body, but we acknowledge the opposition. Opposing forces born of the Cartesian paradigm coerce bodies to become subjects of the mind. Once under the power of Cogito, we exist in strictly defined spaces that align with strictly defined movements, all working to fuel a modern machine of thought. Nevertheless, children, we retain the ability to move solidly and fluidly. We have the capability to create our own space, passing through and piercing the membranes around us. In self-created space, we touch/see one another. We become one. We meet the gaze of the mind-machine and challenge its dogmatic stare. Amen and amen.

dreamscape

2011-08-11T12:32:00.003-06:00

My vision is hazy, but I realize that I am viewing a scene from a suburban neighborhood circa mid-1960s. There is a hedge of rose bushes on the left of a chalky-looking sidewalk and a nondescript road to the right. Two older ladies push strollers, their conversation is indistinct. I see a strikingly thin female figure in a full skirt coming through the hedge, at a distance behind the women in the forefront. She runs as if she's completing the last leg of a marathon. When she catches up to the strollers, she gestures as if she is going to speak. Instead, she inhales violently and passes out.

Flash Forward

The rose-hedge girl is looking healthy. She is at dinner in a nice restaurant with a nice guy (maybe a first date?). The conversation is nothing special, but she seems completely altered. She is coy, smiling. Throughout the conversation however, the man's gestures conjure flashes of grotesque or absurd imagery. (I see the images, but they are obviously in the girl's mind.) For instance, when he cuts a potato, I see an image of a knife piercing flesh. As the dinner continues, it becomes less conversation, more flashes of trauma. Eventually, I see only the images, flashing next to each other.

Flash Back

I am the girl. I am in a house. There is a man whom I both love and hate. I respect him and crave his attention, but he punishes me--ties me to the bed, cuts my hair, forces me to drink things. I cannot make out his features, only his eyes. Big. Dark. Always watching. The house has a greenish light that permeates every wall.

Transition

I am in a room in the house that appears different. The light is peachy, coming from a window. I know that I can get out. The window is stiff, covered in rust and chipped paint. I manage to pull it up and climb out. I hear footsteps behind me. Without looking back, I run through a garden toward a hedge. I force my way through the hedge and see two women in the distance. I know that they can help. I run toward them, intending to make polite conversation. Instead, I am overwhelmed and faint. Things have come full circle.

I wake up.

sorry, this is the real thing

2011-08-11T12:28:00.001-06:00

http://www.felissimo.co.jp/syrup/v34/cfm/products_detail001.cfm?gcd=618834&wk=16237

at last

2011-07-29T11:32:00.002-06:00

http://syrup-tokyo.com/

a list

2011-07-24T15:06:00.003-06:00

1. 90s reinterpretation of the 50s

2. Rickie and Rayanne

3. Funk (acid jazz?)

4. My mom

5. Roots, braids, and dirty blonde

6. Loafers

7. Socks and sandals

8. Rice

9. David Bowie

10. Jack for a girl?

project: self portrait

2011-07-21T20:32:00.002-06:00

peanut butter everywhere

2011-07-18T11:33:00.002-06:00

I vaguely remember waking up at 3 am and hearing my stomach growl. I think I zombied myself into the kitchen and cut up an apple and spread it with peanut butter. (Are you amazed?) I then ate my snack in bed and went back to sleep. Or so I thought...

This morning, I woke up. (Sometimes I amaze myself.) I started to walk toward the bathroom, only to realize that I had stepped in something. First thought = cat poop. (No, please, no!) But it smelled suspiciously of peanut butter. I look down and saw several smears of pb on the rug. What??? I wiped off my foot and attempted to do the same with the rug (which was pretty difficult with a paper towel and the crusty nature of the peanut butter...) Weird. I swear I just ate the peanut buttery snack in my bed.

I brushed my teeth and came back to the room. Stepped in a similar-feeling substance. Seriously? Peanut butter on the hardwood floors by my dresser. Upon closer inspection, peanut butter UNDER the dresser. Peanut butter by my night stand. Peanut butter on the door knob.

I am still boggled as to what went down at 3 in the morning. It appears that I had a personal dance party with the Jif jar. I guess we'll never know.

help my pretty friend

2011-07-14T20:09:00.002-06:00

My talented buddy, Natalie Neal, is making a short film and could use some backers! Take a peak: http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/natalieneal/rose-and-sophia

this is performance studies...

2011-07-13T10:01:00.004-06:00

André Lepecki writes that the ontology of modernity lies in movement. In relation to performance, dance and movement have become increasingly synonymous. Between temporal-spatial “progression” and compartmentalization in the arts, dance theorists define dance as per the codified movement technique of contemporary dance pioneers Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey, and Mary Wigman. In a more general sense, movement has become a greater part of Western society. The continual advancement of technology enables us to move across long distances, both physically and virtually. Greater access to diverse regions of the world enables ethnographers to study and dissect heretofore unknown cultures and cultural performances.

While Deborah Kapchan proposes that this accessibility could represent the “promise” of cross-cultural understanding, the text of Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett may show that the costs outweigh the benefits of increased global mobility. Cultural performance may become spectacle rather than ceremony, supported and consumed by a tourist population. Our new challenge is that of discerning authenticity—which cultural movements are genuine? The answer may lie somewhere in between the movement that is quotidian and choreographed; in the movement codes that defy explicit codification.

With the Industrial Revolution and political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, modernity rushed into being. With it came scientific enlightenment, religious awakening, helpful technologies, and specialized art forms. Western society began to experience a continual pull from an inescapably forward-moving force. However, what might be translated as societal progress held serious implications for the field of performance theory. Lepecki writes “progression” in dance studies meant specialization and definition of the essence of dance. John Martin famously held that dance was movement, evidenced by the foundational movements of modern dance pioneers. However, strictly aligning dance to movement alone negates the relationship of dance and theoretical dialogue. In actuality, the advancements of modernity limit creativity and innovation.

Limits on artistic creation momentarily aside, the flow of modernity grows (grew?) ever global. Scientific advancement can bring cultures together or expose those that are unknown. For the ambitious ethnographer, elusive cultures are largely accessible via transportation or telecommunication. But the benefit a greater accessibility comes with an inherent cost. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett observes: “Slumming, like tourism more generally, take the spectator to the site, and as areas are canonized in a geography of attractions, whole territories become extended ethnographic theme parks.” What might have been a ethnographic treasure may be a contrived spectacle for consumer desires. For example, dancing that is part of a cultural festival may be heavily influenced by European standards of theatricality. In this case, the effects of modernity make it difficult for the spectator to decipher what is culturally authentic and what is modern choreography.

So far, we can see two distinct effects of modernity on dance performance: (1) increased limitations on the definition of dance, and (2) increased ambiguity as to the origin of choreography. Thus, for dance scholars and ethnographers alike, discovering the foundational truths of dance depends on the ability to look beyond the effects of modernity. The essence of dance must be found at its inception, before it has becomes part of the integrated continuum of modern movement. Accordingly, we must examine dance at the point that it evolves from quotidian gesture. In gesture, movement that is tacitly codified but not choreographed, we see foundational truths of a culture. Gesture is performed by an individual, but understood by a greater body. Giorgio Agamben notes, “It allows the emergence of the being-in-a-medium of human beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension for them.” Gesture reveals the means of symbolic movement, the beginning stages of a more formal cultural display.

In an ethnographic perspective, the understanding of gesture aids in the pursuit of looking beyond the effects of modernity. Gesture has no specific technique, and it is void of theatricality (and thus, the potentially Europeanizing standards of formal performance). It is the product of incidental movement, but not a full-scale production. Agamben concludes, “The gesture is, in this sense, communication of a communicability.” Gesture is the origin of dance performance that speaks to the ethnographer. It is that cultural display which communicates the “communicability” of performance beyond the constraints of modernity. It allows ethnographic recognition of the authentic by exposing the “conversion of experience into finished product.”

a bit of what i'm doing

2011-07-06T07:06:00.003-06:00

In How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austen lectures on the concept of performative speech. He describes, explains, and analyzes performatives in conventional spoken English. Initially, Austen defines the performative by invoking a simple dichotomy of performative versus constative. The author writes that unlike constative statements, performative speech acts are (1) neither true nor false and (2) at least part of doing an action.

However, immediately following his definition, Austen commences a long and somewhat confusing process of revision and amendment. He goes on to classify and reclassify the performative according to a variety of different terms: felicity, utterance, action, force, etc. In many instances, his classifications overlap or even contradict his previous thoughts. By the end of the lecture series, Austen’s process has become an unconventional performance through conventional means. His concrete approach of classification fails to categorize adequately the abstract qualities of the performative. Nonetheless, his shortfall serves his end goal. His play on convention further defines the qualities of performative speech.

Beyond his initial dichotomy, Austen’s process starts with the classification of the performative in terms of felicity. The success or “happiness” of the performative depends on the “good faith” of its performance. Accordingly, the speech must (1) invoke a conventional effect, (2) take place in proper context with appropriate actors, (3) be executed correctly, (4) be executed completely, (5) have the proper intention, and (6) must result in the conventional effect. Any breach of these parameters would be an infelicity. Thus, performatives can be classified as felicitous (“happy”) or infelicitous (“unhappy”).

But Austen does not stop there. Performatives can be classified according to utterance: (1) phonetic, (2) phatic, and (3) rhetic. The noises of the words constitute the phonetic level, the actual words the phatic, and the combination of words to create meaning the rhetic.

In a different vein, performatives can also be classified according to action: (1) locutionary, (2) illocutionary, and (3) perlocutionary. The locutionary performative is the speech-act itself, the illocutionary the speech-act in context, and the perlocutionary the reaction of the speech-act.

From here, Austen takes his classification a step further. He describes the different kinds of speech-acts themselves according to their “illocutionary force”: (1) verdictives, (2) exercitives, (3) commissives, (4) behabitives, and (5) expositives.

At this point, Austen’s explication has become incredibly thick. The number of categories of performatives produces a seemingly exhaustive list of possibilities. It is almost as if any kind of speech could be classified as part of Austen’s performative. Indeed, in his last lecture, Austen himself admits that the constative statement “seems to meet all the criteria we had for distinguishing the illocutionary act”.

Yet, without a distinction between performative and constative, Austen’s exhaustive classification effort may be meaningless. His conventional approach to classifying speech cannot function as a conventional classification tool. At the same time however, the performative aspects of Austen’s speech may give us practical insight into the matter. His failure to create a concrete definition of the performative reveals something about its abstract qualities. The anticlimax of Austen’s conclusion shows us that performative speech may defy convention, despite its conventional make-up of phonetics, phatics, and rhetics.

In between his scientific tables and numbered lists, the author does more than simply lecture—he performs. Employing a dry sense of humor and self-deprecating tone, he undermines himself continually. Throughout the work, he contradicts himself and then acknowledges the contradiction. After defining the classes of illocutionary force, Austen writes that he is “not putting any of this forward as in the very least definitive." Furthermore, he speaks as a moral philosopher, but does not claim to seek after truth. Nonetheless, his humor, tone, and manner may lead us to question the validity of his ideas. In turn, these questions encourage us to seek truths—again, Austen employs contradiction. We see that he classifies our speech, yet his interplay of science and philosophy itself defies classification.

Thus, Austen’s lectures become a play on convention. He uses convention, defies convention, encourages convention, and mocks convention. In doing so, he further defines the performative. Despite its conventional qualities, the performative extends clearly beyond convention. A conventional definition may aid our understanding of how to do things with words, but it cannot account for the abstract quality of what the words accomplish. Like Austen, the performative exists both in and between mediums, capable of both the concrete and the abstract.

studium and punctum

2011-06-20T10:26:00.002-06:00

The subjects are posing in front of the Jellyfish Exhibit. This is a children’s aquarium—they work hard to create their own fun. I notice the upward swirl in the foreground and industrial crunch in the back, but I am fixated on the boy’s pose. He puffs out it his cheeks and raises his hands as if to communicate the nature of the passing fish. (Squishy...?) But the surprising clarity of his large hands and fragile fingers endows the subject with a “freak of nature” quality that surpasses that of the objects of his stare.

this is for me... don't feel obligated to read

2011-06-09T19:11:00.002-06:00

My body hates me and the Kraft singles and fruit loops and frozen hot chocolate I keep feeding it. Starting tomorrow, I'm going to eat clean. According to a book at Barnes and Noble, by making this public, I am 50 percent more likely to go through with it.

Ha. This blog post was not intending for any of you. But now that I know that some of you will be reading it, I feel obligated to stay committed to my new eating habits. (This better workkkkk....)

new stomping ground

2011-05-31T18:29:00.001-06:00

http://www.sohogrand.com/

oxyclean... for hair!

2011-05-21T13:50:00.002-06:00

Is your hair dirty from playing in the sandbox? You need... Oxyclean for Hair!

newness

2011-05-17T14:27:00.002-06:00

morning rain in gotham

2011-05-16T11:44:00.002-06:00

on a budget

2011-05-03T10:32:00.002-06:00

Bleeuuurgchs.

That is the closest onomatopoeia to how I feel about being all grown up and living with constraints. I'm actually using a budget worksheet. Like what bankrupt people do. And people who can't stop using their American Express Delta Skymiles Card. (I'm earning free flights, ok???)

But really. I had to bury my Amex in a pile of fake tattoos to keep me from pulling it out of my pocket every time I see a new H&M celebrity designer collection or an adorable food truck that sells Belgian waffles. (Yes, BELGIAN WAFFLES! *cue the Amelie waltz music*)

Granted, it's not like I'm even budgeting my own money at the mo. (Thanks, parentals.) But the money source is apparently "retrenching". (Good use of British WWII vernacular, Madre.) Thus, (alas!) I am retrenching as well.

No more Belgian waffles. No more Rodarte-inspired chiffon dresses. We're back to the basics.

Wi-Fi at Starbucks.

Lipstick from Walgreens.

Shameless hoarding of free food.

Anyone looking for a cute date for tomorrow?

medical diagnosis 2: SAD

2011-04-23T09:02:00.002-06:00

No, no... not Seasonal Affective Depression. I am not discounting said diagnosis, I am simply diagnosing myself with another version of the acronym.

S.A.D.

Stall Attachment Disorder.

When I use the public loo, I use the same one. Generally speaking, I even use the same stall in the preferred public loo. I call it "Stall Attachment Disorder".

As I'm sure you all can imagine, my SAD state of things can lead to a number of mini-crises when feeling a certain sense of urgency.

Case 1: Stall is occupied.

What? Whaaaaatttt? This is MY stall. Who does this person think she is--hopefully she--that she can just soil my space with her unmentionable business? Inexcusable. (To quote Don Fey... Bossypants, anyone?)

Case 2: Stall is being cleaned.

Thank you for cleaning my personal space, but must it be now? Don't get me wrong, I like a clean facility, but I also semi-dread using one that still has a layer of toxic, bird-killing, baby-eating, carbon-emitting, industrial-strength Lysol on the surface. This stuff can kill birds, for goodness sake! What will it do to my nether regions?

Case 3: Stall is... "out of order"

And you know what I mean by "out of order". I do not feel the need to describe it, but suffice it to say that this is the most crisisey of crises for those who suffer Stall Attachment. It's the best (worst?) evidence that I do not actually own the toilet I utilize. You know why? Someone's leftovers are spilling out the top of it. There. I said it. *Gag reflex* x 1000.

Needless to say, I have resolved to stick to my own personal restroom.

But wait--which one is that again?

my utah fix

2011-04-10T15:49:00.002-06:00

I will officially be in Utah for 10 days before I embark on my New York adventure. By adventure, I mean the part of my life where I move out and start my new life as a graduate student in the Big Apple.

In lieu of said adventure, I am creating a bucket list of things to do in Utah before I say tootles for a good 7 months at least. Luckily for me, my limited time, and my overall limited interest in Utah altogether, my bucket list will be short and sweet.

So far:

1. Sundance and Provo Canyon

2. Cafe Rio

3. D.I. and Savers. (Perhaps this should be number 1?)

4. Annie's gymnastics, Cary's soccer games

5. Meet and greet with baby Ada

6. Official goodbyes with fambam and friendlios. (Most likely in the form of food dates.)

Suggestions?

i am often struck by how many ideas hit me in the head when i have too much to think about already.

2011-04-04T14:14:00.006-06:00

Sometimes, I sit at my desk with nothing to do and think, "Gee. I should really do something worthwhile right now. Like write a screenplay." But the screenplay gods do not work that way.

I am often struck by how many ideas hit me in the head when I have too much to think about already.

This blog would be an example of what usually happens when I have nothing to do. I sit, trying to juice my brain a little, but nothing comes out. Maybe just a plop of blog fodder.

The converse situation, of course, would be when I am walking home from the gym, simultaneously formulating the thesis of my paper on Policy and Effective Governance, while deciding whether or not I'm going spend money on food or just munch on dry cereal for dinner, and... WABAM. Great idea. I should put that into words. After I get home. And shower. And outline my paper. And ultimately decide that I deserve a cupcake for dinner. (It's basically the equivalent of dry cereal, no? Plus extra fat and all things wicked like chocolate ganache.)

So it turns out that my creativity is reduced to this. Ideas about nothing and nothingness. If not particularly intriguing, it is at least somewhat post-modern existentialist.

Maybe David Lynch will read this.

dreams do come true...

2011-03-29T18:33:00.000-06:00

http://www.collegefashionista.com/school/view/trend_cat_eye_chic/

some updates

2011-03-16T16:37:00.002-06:00

1. Top Model? No.

2. NYU? Yes.

3. New haircut? Soon.

(photos courtesy of Miss Moss)

what the H

2011-02-26T08:52:00.002-07:00

1. Go here: http://www.dc50tv.com/community/topmodelauditions/
2. Vote for picture 30, gallery 13. You don't even have to look at the photo. It's really mediocre at best, anyway.
3. You can vote as many times as you want. Just click the back arrow and vote 2 or 10 or 500 times.

4. Voting goes until the 28th.

Just do it.

As my thank you gift to you, some preliminary celebrations in the form of morning rage:

not what you're thinking

2011-02-19T11:15:00.002-07:00

No. This is not the great thing coming from the "womb of my brain"...

But.... oh hey! I auditioned for ANTM today. Sly little contestant number 261.

stay tuned

2011-02-15T17:12:00.003-07:00

That's all I'm gonna say for now. But know that something great is about to emerge from the womb of the brain that is La Penseuse.

Speaking of wombs, my favorite womb just gave birth to a beautiful baby girl named Ada.

Dear Ada,

Congratulations. I can't believe how great you look. I also can't believe how good your mama looks. Wow. You have some great genes, child.

Love,

Auntie C

kind of a big deal

2011-02-01T13:24:00.005-07:00

I'm not sure if you knew this, but THIS is kind of a big deal to me.

My predictions (that are shakier than ever this year...):

Actor in a Leading Role:
Jeff Bridges in “True Grit”
(Even though Colin Firth in “The King's Speech” should win this, in my opinion)

Actor in a Supporting Role:
Christian Bale in “The Fighter”

Actress in a Leading Role:
Jennifer Lawrence in “Winter's Bone”

Actress in a Supporting Role:
Hailee Steinfeld in “True Grit”

Animated Feature Film:
“Toy Story 3” Lee Unkrich

Art Direction:
“True Grit” Production Design: Jess Gonchor; Set Decoration: Nancy Haigh

Cinematography:
“Black Swan” Matthew Libatique

Costume Design:
“I Am Love” Antonella Cannarozzi

Directing:
“Black Swan” Darren Aronofsky

Documentary (Feature):
“Gasland” Josh Fox and Trish Adlesic

Film Editing:
“127 Hours” Jon Harris

Foreign Language Film:
“Biutiful” Mexico

Makeup:
“Alice in Wonderland"

Music (Original Score):
“Inception” Hans Zimmer

Best Picture:
“The King's Speech” Iain Canning, Emile Sherman and Gareth Unwin, Producers

Writing (Adapted Screenplay):
“The Social Network” Screenplay by Aaron Sorkin

Writing (Original Screenplay):
“The King's Speech” Screenplay by David Seidler

What are your predictions?

Let's make this an official pool. Because this is as close to March Madness as I get...

in new york

2011-01-29T13:26:00.002-07:00

Start in stinky-fish-murder-town. End in stinky-fish-murder-town.

Crash land in Harlem. 3 am.

Thank you, Jordan, for the futon.

Good morning, New York.

I love a janky weekend.

adventures in cubicle-land

2011-01-27T13:59:00.003-07:00

Everyday I walk to a desk placed directly in front of a door.

The rolly chair in front of said desk blocks the doorway if I sit more than three inches away from my computer keyboard.

But the limited space is compensated by far with the unlimited access to a box of Splenda and all the envelope glue I could ever want. Plus paper clips. And let's add sticky notes to that list.

Favorite new discovery: the email feature on the fax machine. First, I get to use the touch screen on the copier. This is actually fun for me. Just like typing and pushing buttons, in general. Next, I feed all this paper through a little turnstall and then... What? How did that get in my email account? Love it. (In all seriousness, I heart Mr. DCCopier.)

Today, we had ice cream cake for my birthday. In the Big Man's office. I sat as still as possible while digesting and subtley redistributed the crumbs that fell off my plate by kicking around my feet. Unfortunately, I think the crumbs just stuck to my shoes, which I then tracked in the prestigious halls of the Rayburn House Office Building. Perhaps the President himself will step on one of my cake crumbs someday.

Let's be real. I love this place. I like the envelope glue. And the sticky notes. And the occasional opportunity to chill out with ice cream cake in a Congressman's office.

Did I mention that we have our own post office here?

not for the faint of heart

2011-01-19T19:07:00.003-07:00

Thanks, Kristin.

Enjoy.

http://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=10150383627015602&comments

new photos...

2011-01-09T13:45:00.004-07:00

www.amandacastleberryphotography.blogspot.com

a cool girl, an amazing photographer, and a great friend.

here

2011-01-08T09:22:00.003-07:00

I am sitting here in my 4th floor apartment at the the Barlow center--just south of Pennsylvania Avenue on L Street. I love this location. Last night I literally stepped out my front door and into a Thai restaurant where I got this amazing pad thai (that, incidentally, I am eating for breakfast right now.)

Apparently, my roommate and I got the "big room"--thanks, Dawna! It's pretty nice. The bathroom is huge. Probably because it used to be a handicapped bathroom, if I'm interpreting the bars around the toilet and the seat in the shower correctly.

Downside: my mattress feels like cardboard. I need to find a memory foam topper asap. And a blanket. (Last night = coat + towel)

airport

2011-01-07T11:52:00.003-07:00

I've never flown Southwest, but I already hate it. I'm so confused by this system of numbers and letters and open seating and all of these flatscreen TVs bombarding me from every angle. Okay. Whatever. My ticket was cheap--I got it during a special "Halloween" sale. Ha. Case in point.

Goal for today: Optimism. I'm headed to the EAST COAST... TO LIVE! Bwahaha. The Secret really does work. Thanks for the advice, Leighton.

So hungry right now.

discovery

2010-12-27T19:53:00.002-07:00

Discovery:

I got 6 credits of Political Science for Model United Nations, not 3.

Political Science 350 counted for a requirement AND an elective.

Summary:

I could have graduated with a major and minor this semester taking only 4 credits. 1 Poli Sci class. 1 Dance class.

The End.

waddyathink

2010-12-23T19:14:00.001-07:00

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4np6YCClc74

a more polished version

2010-12-11T18:00:00.001-07:00

Same thing. Only better.

The founding of the United States of America displayed a singular fervent zeal among Americans. The Revolution had distilled a spirit of transcendental unity and purpose over the fledgling nation. The founding leaders of the new state foresaw a bright future of freedom and equality, maintained by the righteous boundaries of a solid constitution. Indeed, since its earliest colonial days, the nation demonstrated a reverence for the liberal rights it deemed as self-evident. Moreover, early settlers espoused a particular brand of liberal rights, emphasizing freedom of the individual and his religion. The Puritan colonists of Massachusetts envisioned a society in which freedom meant the freedom to act as pure disciples of Christ, uninhibited by the oppressive structure of monarchy and aristocracy. Freedom was a virtue. Freedom was sacred. Freedom was the antithesis to tyranny and despotism, a perceived plague of the Old World.

Tocqueville and Civil Religion

Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw an entirely different end for democratic freedom than a bright future of peace and equality. Tocqueville observed that democratic freedom was inherently prone to the malaise it so proudly defied. In an unchecked democratic society, tyranny may infiltrate its own foundation of so-called self-evident rights. Democratic prosperity may simply translate as democratic prosperity for the determining majority. The majority is a tyrant over itself, succumbing to insatiable desires by changing custom and law according to its unbridled whim. More dangerous still, he writes that “the very essence of democratic government consists in absolute sovereignty of the majority; for there is nothing in democratic states that is capable of resisting it” (Bowen 324). In such a society, there is no safeguard against persecution of minority or disenfranchised groups. There is no safeguard against any kind of atrocity.

At the same time, however, Tocqueville recognized that American democracy was unprecedented in the social power of its mythic fervor and its sense of religiosity. In his seminal text, Democracy in America, he implies that this “Americanness” may actually deter the despotic tendencies of modern democracy (Bowen 346). This observed collective sensibility has finally come to be recognized by many as the American civil religion. Unlike Rousseau’s utilitarian description of civil religion, Tocqueville’s description is mythic in nature. This religion draws its cohesiveness not from the institution of the state, but from the sensus communis of the people. In this sense, we may describe American civil religion as a natural unifier, as a direct derivative of the American mythic sensibility.

Tocqueville writes that this underlying sense of unified value is part of a democratic poiesis. He proposes that American democracy is not entirely void of poetry, of gods (Gilchrist 23). Although ruled by the common, the American regime is not godless. Rather, Americans have brought gods down to earth in an age of man. The result is a new kind of poetry, a democratic one. A poetry that is accessible to everyman as a product of freedom and equality. The American civil religion that deters tyranny is not one of utility. It is one of religiosity through myth and poetry, of which freedom is the highest virtue. Indeed, we can witness this concept of civil religion in the writings of great American poets. The works of Whitman, Frost, and Steinbeck are thoroughly American yet undeniably profound. They celebrate the muses of the common man and the philosophy of the New World. Explicit examples of American myth and religiosity can especially be found in the texts of John Steinbeck.

In his well-known novel, East of Eden, Steinbeck explores the concept of Americanness in a mythical-religious setting. In doing so, the author raises questions of faith, dogma, justice and mercy. As readers, we come to answer these questions through his allegorical narrative that mirrors the book of Genesis. God and his creations—the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel—are realized in the Hamilton and Trask families, both struggling to find a sense of faith and freedom in the face of everyday hardship. Ultimately, the poetic accounts\ of Steinbeck’s characters leads us to greater self-awareness and understanding of spirituality residing in the common man.

This, I propose, is Tocqueville’s vision of American civil religion, of democratic poiesis. Steinbeck’s work is an example of myth, religion, and art that is fundamentally American and self-consciously so. It is this kind of self-awareness that upholds the ideal of freedom. And just as our Founding Fathers and Puritan ancestors clearly proclaimed, virtuous freedom is the antithesis to tyranny.

The Perils of Modernity

With the spread of Enlightenment thinking came the rise of liberalism. Like its contemporary of scientific innovation, liberalism flourished as the product of reason and calculation. Human reason turned the liberal values of freedom and equality into self-evident truths, both logical and apparent. Technology provided the means for ideology to spread and infect the collective consciousness of the western world, provoking revolution and democratization. Modern citizens gained political clout as the aristocracy declined to a state of washed-up equality—life was leveled. While the Americans and the European working class celebrated their newfound liberty, Tocqueville recognized another side of the liberal utopia. He observed that “equality of conditions produces an unwillingness to defer to the view of any other human, a condition of complete but misguided self-reliance arising from assumptions of equal worth in its most debased sense” (Deneen 218). Tocqueville saw what Paul Gorner describes as a new form a slavery: “Once separated from religion reason becomes exclusively purposive or instrumental. As there are no intrinsically rational ends, reason can only be exercised in taking the most effective means to non-rational ends” (160). The technology inherent in modernity excludes morality from reason. For the purposes of efficiency and progress, modern reason has no greater end than efficiency and progress. In other words, its means become its ends.

In a democratic setting, liberal values are reasonable insofar as they are useful. Freedom and equality are useful to a democracy because they have the power elevate the common man to a position of political authority. A man is free to voice his opinion and possesses the same ability to do so as his neighbor. Yet, in the pursuit of efficiency and progress, it becomes reasonable that the voice of the majority determines political outcomes. Strengthened by its own freedom and equality, the majority obtains unlimited control. The majority becomes the modern tyrant and the democratic soul becomes unbridled and selfish. Citizens act according to selfish interests, which cannot preserve the well-being of all democratic citizens. Arthur Melzer notes, “In this new world, obedience would result not from the static structure of habit, consensus, and reverence for the past but from the dynamics of the desire to get ahead” (299). Democracy becomes slavish to itself, and democratic peoples suffer at the hands of unchecked majority action. Modernity and modern thought cannot provide an antidote to its inherent malaise.

An American Religion

In the first volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville discusses more than just democracy and modernity. His observations of American political and social life significantly emphasize the relationship of the nation and its religion. Surprised by what he found, he reports that “upon my arrival in the United States the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention […] In France, I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America, I found they were intimately united” (Bowen 394). Unlike other modern democracies, wherein Christianity had been replaced by indignant secularism, the United States displayed a religiosity reminiscent of its Revolutionary spirit. Ironically, the strong spiritual-political relationship relied upon its own institutional separation. Tocqueville continues on:

As a member of the Roman Catholic Church, I was more particularly brought into contact with several of its priests, with whom I became intimately acquainted. To each of these men I explained my astonishment and my doubts: I found that they differed upon matters of detail alone, and that they all attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in their country mainly to the separation of church and state. (Bowen 394-395)

Tocqueville clearly noticed a distinction between the religions of the Old World and the New. In Europe, the wave of political liberalism outwardly disdained the Catholic Church, manifesting that liberal thought and Catholic thought could not coexist. Yet here in America, the same Roman Catholic Church remained a “peaceful dominion” in a proudly liberal political environment. Evidently, the same faith had a distinctly American counterpart.

In America, the political and the religious “march” in the same direction. The sensus communis of its people is both reasonably enlightened and religiously faithful. American democracy and religiosity propagate the same aura of hope and progress toward the greater good of freedom. We see that this religiosity is not necessarily one of institution; it is one of collective feeling. Robert N. Bellah, a prominent scholar on American religion, comments that “though much is selectively derived from Christianity, this religion is clearly not itself Christianity” (5).

Steinbeck’s East of Eden may be considered in the same light—undoubtedly drawn from Christianity, but only implicitly so. While the novel never explicitly claims to be a modern scriptural account, it is clearly written as a alternative account of the book of Genesis. Institutional religion is never the subject. Rather, the text relays the story of two intertwined families with direct symbolic references to two key biblical relationships: Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel. In his introduction to the book, David Wyatt writes that “Steinbeck called East of Eden ‘the first book,’ and indeed it has the primordial power and simplicity of myth” (Steinbeck xi). Indeed, the book is set in rural Western America—perhaps the most mythic of American settings. Furthermore, while only implicitly Christian, East of Eden is explicitly American. At one point in the novel, the narrator writes: “In Salinas we were aware that the United States was the greatest and most powerful nation in the world. Every American was a rifleman by birth, and one American was worth ten or twenty foreigners in a fight” (Steinbeck 484). The characters go on to march into the front lines of World War I with that same political and religious fervor. The patriotic imagery and depictions of piety most certainly align with Tocqueville’s observations. Likewise, the mythic-style of its narrative fits Bellah’s description well. Again, the American civil religion is implicitly Christian but explicitly American. It is a collective feeling of reverence and zeal for the political. It is mythic rather than material.

Religion as Antidote and the Problem of Utility

It is precisely this civil religion that Tocqueville saw as America’s potential source of resilience to despotism. The perils of modernity generally stem from the dominance of rationality in thought. Rational thinking lends itself to technological action, justified by standards of efficiency rather than morality. Religion, especially that with primal and mythic roots, exists independent of modern thought. By modern standards, it is not rational and thus not predisposed to technological use. While religion is not immune to the effects of modernization, it is founded upon morality myths rather than rationality. Patrick Deneen notes accordingly: “[Tocqueville] believed that democracies should […] avail themselves of the moral resources of religion as a counterweight to those more virulent tyrannical leanings that inhered in the ‘rule of the people’” (215). However, he also believed that general Christianity must be modified to retain political applicability (Kessler 124).

Tocqueville recognized that certain elements of American Christianity were independent of institutional Christianity. The American civil religion resided in sensus communis rather than being institutional. Perhaps this collective and implicit religiosity could be the foundation for the “modified” Christianity needed for democracy. Nevertheless, in his writings, Tocqueville does not dismiss the institutional applicability of American religion. Joshua Mitchell maintains that “Tocqueville focuses upon three institutional mechanisms that moderate the democratic soul: family, religion, and associational life” (xi). While Tocqueville acknowledged that American religiosity lacked certain institutional qualities, he saw a place for the utility of formal Christianity:

Tocqueville finds religious rules fixing limits upon the actions of democratic self- government, tempering the selfishness of liberal self-interest. […] Thus, Tocqueville finds religion useful in democracy, to the state and to the individual, for providing a moral aura around the dogma of modern liberalism. (Gilchrist 19, italics added)

Tocqueville envisioned an American society in which Christian teachings were an active tool at home, in school, and among citizens.

Tocqueville’s vision of usefulness, however, brings up a potential contradiction of ideas. Tocqueville feared “the loss of meaning and knowledge that is sure to come with modernity’s degradation of human being” (Gilchrist 13)—namely the dominance of rationality in all thought forms and the inevitable instrumentalization of humanity that follows. But if Tocqueville views America’s religiosity as a means toward political ends, how is it different from any other technological use of religion? Is Tocqueville’s approach dominated by rationality? At the same time, though, he maintains that “religion is most useful to democracy when it is not valued for its usefulness” (Deneen 216). Religion is useful to democracy when it is not “used”. American civil religion may be the antidote to modern malaise because it is far more than a mere tool toward ends of political good. It is a good in itself. It is both good and useful.

Both Good and Useful

In Plato’s Republic, we learn of three kinds of goods: those that are inherently good; those that are not inherently good, but good in their effects; and those that are inherently good and also good in their effects. Socrates believes that the latter is the finest kind of good, that which brings the blessings of happiness (Reeve 357b-358a). Tocqueville’s writings indicate that he recognized the potential for this kind of good in American religiosity. Not only did the civil religion uphold the virtues of Christianity, it also lead to an end of political goodness. It was both a political means and a moral end. However, the American religion was a new kind of moral end. It was a democratically moral end—a virtuous end for both religion and politics debased by the leveling effects of democracy. This moral end is freedom in America. Kessler writes, “Americans honored religion as the indispensable guardian of their free institutions and asserted that no civilized community could endure without it” (130).

In America, the fundamental tenet of both religion and politics was freedom. Accordingly, both peacefully pursued the goal of freedom and upheld one another as a source of this end. Unlike the purely rational pursuit of freedom, which shunned all superstitious and irrational thought, the American pursuit was deeply spiritual. Perhaps this is because American freedom did not originally stem from Enlightened thought, it stemmed from its mythic Puritan roots. Freedom was not a mechanism for democracy, it was the end of a pilgrimage. It was a moral good before it became a rational good. Nevertheless, the moral goodness of freedom became useful in the political pursuit of freedom. When American colonists utilized their sense of freedom to found a democracy, it was this mythic and moral sensibility. The sense of moral freedom was the sensus communis during the transition to democracy. The sense of moral freedom was the American civil religion. American religion is the religion of freedom, both good and useful.

Steinbeck on Freedom: Timshel

Upon reading the first words of East of Eden, we see that Steinbeck’s picturesque America is far more than an arbitrary location. The young narrator describes the Salinas Valley as an alternately beautiful and dangerous place in which life and death are merely part of a smooth cycle. He speaks in plain, graceful words: “And it never failed that during the dry years the people forgot about the rich years, and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years. It was always that way” (Steinbeck 5-6). Steinbeck’s America is a sleepy, antediluvian garden—a place that retains its Eden-like qualities, but also suffers the pain of mortality. More importantly, it is a place where fallen man still walks with God. His characters live in a world of temptation and toil, but have direct access to the Divine. Throughout the book, divine wisdom comes from the mouths of humble foreigners living among small-town, working-class Americans. Adam Trask, a hardworking farmer, communes daily with Sam Hamilton, a wise and prophetic Irishman. Cal and Aron Trask, sons of Adam, commune with Lee, a mysterious Chinese servant and scholar. Although not American by birth, the wise men are ever present, ever accessible. The narrator describes both Hamilton and Lee as men who loved long conversations, who spoke many languages, and who had a mysterious but magnetic aura about them (Steinbeck 272, 352, 376).

Divine access aside, the characters more often experience the mediocre ups and downs of mortality. This usually translates as a series of cyclical, generational relationships that continually reenact the Biblical myth of Cain and Abel. Adam Trask and Charles Trask are brothers. Adam is a bit naive, Charles is a bit precocious. Adam is meek, Charles is aggressive. Charles betrays his brother and moves to the East Coast (a clear allusion to the eastward-bound Land of Nod, residence of Cain and his descendants). After moving to the West Coast, Adam marries and has two sons: Cal and Aron. As expected, Cal is manipulative and savvy, while Aron is spiritual and unassuming. As the boys grow up, there is little wonder as to how their lives will unfold. Aron plans to join the clergy; Cal to move to the worldly boomtown of Monterey.

But here, Steinbeck surprises us. Cal begins to question the cyclical nature of his existence. After some investigation, Cal discovers his mother is a prostitute. When Aron finds out, he cannot handle the shock. He immediately runs away to join the ranks of soldiers sent to die in combat. In direct contrast, Cal remains to take care of his dying father and the woman that Aron abandoned. He is there to witness the dramatic last moment of his father’s life:

Adam looked up with sick weariness. His lips parted and failed and tried again. Then his lungs filled. He expelled the air and his lips combed the rushing sigh. His whispered word seemed to hang in the air: “Timshel!” His eyes closed and he slept. (Steinbeck 602).

It is this concluding passage that accounts for Cal’s break from the cycle. Timshel is the key.

Earlier in the novel, we learn about timshel from Lee. In one of his long conversations with Adam, Lee comments that various translations of the Bible record the Cain and Abel story differently. In the King James version of the Bible, Jehovah tells Cain that he “shalt rule” over sin. In the American Standard edition, Jehovah gives an order: “Do thou rule over [sin].” But in the original Hebrew text, the passage reads that Cain “mayest” rule over sin—timshel (Steinbeck 301-302). The first translation offers a promise to Cain, the second issues a commandment, but the third gives him a choice. Lee exclaims:

“But ‘Thou mayest’! Why that makes a man great, that gives him stature with the gods, for in his weakness and his filth and his murder of his brother he has still the great choice. He can choose his course and fight it through and win.” (Steinbeck 304)

When Cain, a fallen and filthy man, has the freedom to choose, he, too, can obtain exaltation. He can choose to the leave the stagnant life of his Eden-like surroundings, and he chooses to go east of Eden. Cal, too, chooses to leave his Eden-like state. He chooses to see his mother for what she is. And Steinbeck implies that Cal may choose exaltation. In reality, the stagnation of Eden is no better than damnation. The words themselves are synonymous. It follows that freedom to choose is the potential for exaltation. In no other setting can exaltation be obtained. Freedom allows man to “choose his course and fight it through and win”.

In Steinbeck’s mythic portrayal, freedom is the savior of the common man. The “gods”, represented by foreign characters like Hamilton and Lee, have descended to live among men. While still separated from the gods by mysterious barriers like language and knowledge, men have direct access to them. And when they choose to commune with them, they learn about the value of freedom. They learn that freedom is the only way to escape Eden. They learn that freedom can be exaltation.

Democratic Poiesis

Clear parallels can be drawn between Tocqueville’s work and Steinbeck’s mythic narrative. In Tocqueville’s America, we see great potential in the face of inevitable demise. Modernity capitalizes on selfish interests and widespread equality, leading to the dominance of rational thought and technological action, which proves fertile ground for the seeds of despotism. In Steinbeck’s America, we see a place that is both Divine and fallen. Mortals are stuck in cyclical behavior, an Eden-like and static state, toiling endlessly in the fields just to greet their given fate. In this sense, Steinbeck’s fallen Eden begins to look like Tocqueville’s modernity. In both cases, men have become less than human. They have become technological beings.

Yet in both cases, there is a uniquely American antidote to a technological existence. Tocqueville observes a sense of pre-Enlightenment religiosity in the United States. It is a mythic sense of freedom—freedom as a virtue rather than an instrument. American freedom balances the debasing effects of equality while maintaining moral sensibility. Likewise, Steinbeck shows us that gods live among men in America. Only here can Chinese, Irish, and Americans coexist and interact as equals. Steinbeck’s characters, fallen and common, have access to the Divine. And when they access the Divine, they learn that the greatest good is freedom. Freedom is the savior of the common man. Freedom is the American civil religion.

Freedom brings awareness of choice. Men can choose salvation. In democratic America, gods live among men. Consequently, men are not consigned to a static and fallen existence. They can be more than technological beings through their access to Divinity. Men can be artisans. Men can be scholars. Men can be poets. All men have the opportunity to use their freedom to rise above the leveling effects of democracy. They can choose to create a new kind of poetry. Poetry for the common man.

As Tocqueville recognizes and Steinbeck records, America can be the place of democratic poiesis. It does not have to be a place of inhumanity and tyranny. If men are aware of the Divine, they can choose salvation. As Americans, it is our duty to recognize the Divine that is around us in myth, religion, and art. Great American works, like those of Steinbeck, bring a greater level of awareness about both the beauty and bestiality of democracy. We cannot choose the beautiful if we do not recognize both. It is my hope that American religiosity will maintain its poetic nature; that our fervor for freedom will lead us to choose salvation.

In America, the nation continually aspires to 'a more perfect union'; through the American Civil Religion, it approximates its aspirations. Through it, America is perfected, the experiment challenged, and destiny approached. In civil religion, America approaches the Divine. (Gilchrist 34)

References

Bellah, Robert N. 1967. Civil religion in America. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 96, no. 1 (Winter): 1- 21.

Deneen, Patrick J. 2005. Democratic faith. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gilchrist, Brent. 2010. Vico, Tocqueville, and America’s abridgment of modernity.

Gilchrist, Brent. The American civil religion debate. Master’s thesis.

Gorner, Paul. 2000. Twentieth century German philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kessler, Sanford. Tocqueville on civil religion and liberal democracy. The Journal of Politics 39: 119-46.

Melzer, Arthur. 1993. Technology in the Western political tradition. Ed. Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mitchell, Joshua. 1995. The fragility of freedom: Tocqueville on religion, democracy, and the American future. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Plato. 2004. The republic. Ed. C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company.

Steinbeck, John. 1952. East of Eden. London: Penguin Books.

Tocqueville, Alexis. 1864. Democracy in America. Vol. 1. Ed. Francis Bowen. Trans. Henry Reeve. Cambridge, MA: Server and Francis.

this took a semester

2010-12-10T10:34:00.000-07:00

Tocqueville and Civil Religion

At the same time, however, Tocqueville recognized that American democracy was unprecedented in its social power of mythic fervor and its sense of religiosity. In his seminal text, Democracy in America, he implies that this “Americanness” may actually deter the despotic tendencies of modern democracy (Bowen 346). This observed collective sensibility has finally come to be recognized by many as the American civil religion. Unlike Rousseau’s utilitarian description of civil religion, Tocqueville’s description is mythic in nature. This religion draws its cohesiveness not from the institution of the state, but from the sensus communis of the people. In this sense, we may describe American civil religion as a natural unifier, as a direct derivative of the American mythic sensibility.

In his well-known novel, East of Eden, Steinbeck explores the concept of Americanness in a mythical-religious setting. In doing so, the author raises questions of faith, dogma, justice and mercy. As readers, we come to answer these questions through his allegorical narrative that mirrors the book of Genesis. God and his creations—the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel—are realized in the Hamilton and Trask families, both struggling to find a sense of faith and freedom in the face of everyday hardship. Ultimately, the poetic accounts of Steinbeck’s characters lead us to greater self-awareness and understanding of spirituality residing in the common man.

The Perils of Modernity

With the spread of Enlightenment thinking came the rise of liberalism. Like its contemporary of scientific innovation, liberalism flourished as the product of reason and calculation. Human reason turned the liberal values of freedom and equality into self-evident truths, both logical and apparent. Technology provided the means for the ideology to spread and infect the collective consciousness of the western world, provoking revolution and democratization. Modern citizens gained political clout as the aristocracy declined to a state of washed-up equality—life was leveled. While the Americans and the European working class celebrated their newfound liberty, Tocqueville recognized another side of the liberal utopia. He observed that “equality of conditions produces an unwillingness to defer to the view of any other human, a condition of complete but misguided self-reliance arising from assumptions of equal worth in its most debased sense” (Deneen 218). Tocqueville saw what Paul Gorner describes as a new form a slavery: “Once separated from religion reason becomes exclusively purposive or instrumental. As there are no intrinsically rational ends, reason can only be exercised in taking the most effective means to non-rational ends” (160). The technology inherent in modernity excludes morality from reason. For the purposes of efficiency and progress, modern reason has no greater end than efficiency and progress. In other words, its means become its ends.

An American Religion

In the first volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville discusses more than just democracy and modernity. His observations of American political and social life significantly emphasize the relationship of the nation and its religion. Surprised by what he found, he reports that “upon my arrival in the United States the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention […] In France, I had almost alway seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America, I found they were intimately united” (Bowen 394). Unlike other modern democracies, wherein Christianity had been replaced by indignant secularism, the United States displayed a religiosity reminiscent of its Revolutionary spirit. Ironically, the strong spiritual-political relationship relied upon its own institutional separation. Tocqueville continues on:

Steinbeck’s East of Eden may be considered in the same light—undoubtedly drawn from Christianity, but only implicitly so. While the novel never explicitly claims to be a modern scriptural account, it is clearly written as a alternative account of the book of Genesis. Institutional religion is never the subject. Rather, the text relays the story of two intertwined families with direct symbolic references to two key biblical relationships: Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel. In his introduction to the book, David Wyatt writes that “Steinbeck called East of Eden ‘the first book,’ and indeed it has the primordial power and simplicity of myth” (Steinbeck xi). Indeed, the book is set in rural Western America—perhaps the most mythic of American settings. Furthermore, while only implicitly Christian, East of Eden is explicitly American. At one point in the novel, the narrator writes: “In Salinas we were aware that the United States was the greatest and most powerful nation in the world. Every American was a rifleman by birth, and one American was worth ten or twenty foreigners in a fight” (Steinbeck 484). The characters go on to march into the front lines of World War I with that same political and religious fervor. The patriotic imagery and depictions of piety most certainly align with Tocqueville’s observations. Likewise, the mythic-style of its narrative fits Bellah’s description well. The American civil religion is implicitly Christian but explicitly American. It is a collective feeling of reverence and zeal for the political. It is mythic rather than material.

Religion as Antidote and the Problem of Utility

Tocqueville envisioned an American society in which Christian teachings were an active tool at home, in school, and among citizens.

Both Good and Useful

Steinbeck on Freedom: Timshel

Upon reading the first words of East of Eden, we see that Steinbeck’s picturesque America is far more than an arbitrary location. The young narrator describes the Salinas Valley as an alternately beautiful and dangerous place in which life and death are merely part of a smooth cycle. He speaks in plain, graceful words: “And it never failed that during the dry years the people forgot about the rich years, and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years. It was always that way” (Steinbeck 5-6). Steinbeck’s America is a sleepy, antediluvian garden—a place that retains its Eden-like qualities, but also suffers the pain of mortality. More importantly, it is a place where fallen man still walks with God. His characters live in a world of temptation and toil, but have direct access to the Divine. Throughout the book, divine wisdom comes from the mouths of humble foreigners living among small-town, working-class Americans. Adam Trask, a hardworking farmer, communes daily with Sam Hamilton, a wise and prophetic Irishman. Cal and Aron Trask, sons of Adam, commune daily with Lee, a mysterious Chinese servant and scholar. Although not American by birth, the wise men are ever present, ever accessible. The narrator describes both Hamilton and Lee as men who loved long conversations, who spoke many languages, and who had a mysterious but magnetic aura about them (Steinbeck 272, 352, 376).

Adam looked up with sick weariness. His lips parted and failed and tried again. Then his lungs filled. He expelled the air and his lips combed the rushing sigh. His whispered word seemed to hang in the air: “Timshel!” His eyes closed and he slept. (Steinbeck 602).

It is this concluding passage that accounts for Cal’s break from the cycle. Timshel is the key.

Earlier in the novel, we learn about timshel from Lee. In one of his long conversations with Adam, Lee comments that various translations of the Bible record the Cain and Abel story differently. In the King James version of the Bible, Jehovah tells Cain that he “shalt rule” over sin. In the American Standard edition, Jehovah gives an order: “Do thou rule over [sin].” But in the original Hebrew, the passage reads that Cain “mayest” rule over sin—timshel (Steinbeck 301-302). The first translation offers a promise to Cain, the second issues a commandment, but the third gives him a choice. Lee exclaims:

When Cain, a fallen and filthy man, has the freedom to choose, he, too, can obtain exaltation. He can choose to the leave the stagnant life of that remains in his Eden-like surroundings; he can choose to go east of Eden. Cal, too, chooses to leave his Eden-like state. He chooses to see his mother for what she is. And Steinbeck implies that Cal may choose exaltation. In reality, the stagnation of Eden is no better than damnation. The words themselves are synonymous. It follows that freedom to choose is the potential for exaltation. In no other setting can exaltation be obtained.

In Steinbeck’s mythic portrayal, freedom is the savior of the common man. The “gods”, represented by foreign characters like Hamilton and Lee, have descended to live among men. While still separated from the gods by mysterious barriers like language and knowledge, the men have direct access to them. And when they are aware of this, they learn about the value of freedom. They learn that freedom is the only way to escape Eden. They learn that freedom can be exaltation.

Democratic Poiesis

Clear parallels can be drawn between Tocqueville’s work and Steinbeck’s mythic narrative. In Tocqueville’s America, we see great potential in the face of inevitable demise. Modernity capitalizes on selfish interests and widespread equality, leading to the dominance of rational thought and technological action. In Steinbeck’s America, we see a place of that is both Divine and fallen. Mortals are stuck in cyclical behavior, an Eden-like and static state, toiling endlessly in the fields just to greet their given fate. In this sense, Steinbeck’s fallen Eden begins to look like Tocqueville’s modernity. In both cases, men have become less than human. They have become technological beings.

Yet in both cases, there is a uniquely American antidote to a technological existence. Tocqueville observes a sense of pre-Enlightenment religiosity. It is a mythic sense of freedom as a virtue rather than an instrument. American freedom balances the debasing effects of equality while protecting moral sensibility. Likewise, Steinbeck shows us that gods live among men in America. Only in this location could Chinese, Irish, and Americans coexist. Steinbeck’s characters, fallen and common, have access to the Divine. And when they commune, they learn that salvation is the freedom to choose. Freedom is the savior of the common man. Freedom is the American civil religion.

Freedom brings awareness of choice. Men can choose salvation. They do not have to be stuck in a static and fallen existence. They can be more than technological beings. Men can be artisans. Men can be scholars. Men can be poets. The gods of the ancients have descended to live among men. Fallen men can choose to commune with the gods. All men have the opportunity to use their freedom to rise above the leveling effects of democracy. As Tocqueville recognizes and Steinbeck records, America can be the place of democratic poiesis. It does not have to be a place of inhumanity and tyranny. If men are aware of the Divine, they can choose salvation.

As Americans, it is our duty to recognize the Divine that is around us in myth, religion, and art. Great American works, like those of Steinbeck, bring a greater level of awareness about both the beauty and bestiality of democracy. We cannot choose the beautiful if we do not recognize it. It is my hope that American religiosity will maintain its poetic nature; that our fervor for freedom will lead us to choose salvation. In conclusion:

end of semester and the like

2010-12-05T23:37:00.002-07:00

Unusual mix of anxiety and elation I'm feeling right now. (Almost a bit S/M?)

That said, I'm going to post some photos that capture my thoughts..

eating

2010-12-01T18:22:00.002-07:00

I think it's only fair that I start off this Christmas season with an homage to eating.

Eating

Create a plate

Of love and hate

But first abate

That desperate state:

The need to simply satiate.

witty, i know

2010-11-23T16:55:00.002-07:00

les yeux

des vieux

disent-moi

pourquoi

cela

c'est ça

I'm not being pretentious. But I made up this witty ditty. And it won't leave my head.

my latest muse

2010-11-18T08:23:00.002-07:00

If you have seen any of my prof pics lately, you will have already realized this abnormal behavior.

un autre

2010-11-16T13:28:00.002-07:00

It's just so fun, you know?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oINjk4jZPk0

this morning

2010-11-15T09:00:00.005-07:00

I woke up this morning.

Correction: I did not wake up this morning.

I needed a little something to help get me going. I decided that listening to Beatles' bestie "Revolution" might perk me up a little. It's like coffee for communists.

Luckily for you, I documented my whole experience via the trusty Mac photobooth.

Et voila:

Ready to take on my day and take out that bourgeoisie.

something in my mouth

2010-11-09T08:04:00.005-07:00

Food, you think?

Gum, you think?

Mouthwash, you think?

A hair accidentally mixed into a pot of spaghetti sauce, you think?

No. Something much worse.

I wake up this morning feeling like P. Diddy... no haha psych, I feel like CRAP. I put a sweater over my pajamas and a scrunchy (yes, a scrunchy--as in the fabric hair adornment popular in the '90s) in my hair and run out the door. Oh wait, I should probably brush my teeth. If I'm going to look like the product of a one night stand from 1994, I should at least freshen my breath.

Run back to the WC. Scavenge my toothbrush from among the 12 other toothbrushes that don't exactly have an owner. (I guess they're the communal toothbrushes for house guests?) I look for toothpaste, but AH! No Aquafresh. And I don't even like Aquafresh. But Aquafresh happens to be the cheapest toothpaste that you can buy in a three-pack at Costco, so I've grown accustomed if not desensitized to it. Instead, I find Bubblemint Sensodyne--For Kids! Desperate, I squeeze the blue goo onto by brush and furiously scrub my molars, trying not to think about the chalky-sweet flavor running down my throat.

It isn't even chalky-sweet. It's like latex. And Pokemon. And blue raspberry Jolly Rancher. And scented Crayola markers.

So If I share a conversation or a passionate kiss with you in the next half hour, don't feel the need to look around for the scratch-and-sniff sticker. It's stuck somewhere in my molars, festering in stagnant childhood.

l'auteur viable?

2010-11-07T11:57:00.004-07:00

Mon Dada et Ma Soeur

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ekb8AMOiF04

me + rose

2010-11-04T10:11:00.003-06:00

celeb sitings

2010-11-03T16:57:00.003-06:00

Yes, in the big NY I definitely saw:

1. Clemence Poesy

2. Thakoon Panichgul

And probably a few more. They were just cleverly hidden behind sunglasses, I'm sure.

my favorite things

2010-11-02T13:39:00.006-06:00

SO many things I could blog about right now.

1. New York City:

-Concrete jungle where dreams are made of... (there's nothing you can't do...)

-Meeting with Associate Director of NYU grad program--"Are you Mormon? You know that most boys in this program are gay...")

-Walk of shame at 8 in the morning wearing girlfriend's sunglasses and a semi-deflated ballerina tutu. (It was a Halloween party, okaaaaay?)

-20 blocks. Airport luggage. 2 am. Brooklyn.

-Bar Pitti = Obnoxious flirtation aimed at free dessert. Big disappointment there.

2. Halloween:

-Endogenous relationship with New York City bullet points. Whatever.

-Danced with an aggressive boy who, I swear, was trying to give me chlamydia. Left the dance floor with scratches on my back. No big deal--I just should have seen it coming when he showed up in a bear costume.

-French pervies took pics up my tutu on the subway. Thank you for "moderate coverage" leotards.

-Red velvet cake at 4 in the morning at The Flame.

3. New obsession with Fellini.

-Too dangerous to discuss

4. I am in love with 2 girls and 1 boy.

sitting, waiting

2010-10-14T13:27:00.009-06:00

I'm sitting outside a professor's office right now.

Problems with this otherwise mundane and normal situation:

1. I am in an absurdly narrow hallway, which means that I have to stand up and move every time someone walks by.

2. There is a pile of candy right outside another professor's office with a sign that says, "Please take one." (This a problem because a) I've taken about seven and b) it's probably contaminated or rotten--why else would someone be willing to give away a pile of mini peanut butter cups???)

3. I am currently (and unavoidably) sitting outside the men's restroom, which has been frequented an unusual amount of times for the short fifteen minutes I've been here. Understandably, this is awkward for both me and any male faculty member who visits said restroom. It's like I'm staking out the facilities or something. And holding my breath simultaneously... just in case...

genius

2010-10-08T09:01:00.003-06:00

This morning, my little brother remembered that he had forgotten to do his homework. His assignment was to write a poem about the Utah State Government (red flag, right there). After he left for school, I read a draft of his handiwork:

"The Gorvment is a good press,

The questin is are they in a good mood.

They are good people,

Accsept my questin is, is The boss a dude."

Genius.

Medical Case 1: TSEH

2010-10-04T11:29:00.012-06:00

As of five minutes ago, I have decided that it is high time La Penseuse use her creative thinking powers toward selfless ends.

Yes. Exactly what you're thinking. I will now be offering medical commentary on rare pathologies for my 12 followers and the countless numbers of anonymous web drones that visit my blog daily.

Just this morning, La Penseuse was diagnosed** with a heretofore unknown disorder called Temporal-Spatial Emptiness Hyperawareness (TSEH). Symptoms are characterized by intense consciousness of silence and vacant spaces, which often leads to attempted compensation for perceived emptiness. Compensation manifestation may include, but is not limited to:

1. Perceived need to "rehabilitate" conversation that is otherwise lacking in wit, originality, intensity, or verbality in general.

2. Desire to relocate to unoccupied areas (i.e. desks in a classroom, chairs at a dinner table, dance party "circles" etc.) in order to balance the distribution of emptiness or lack thereof in a bounded space.

3. Compulsion to move hands and/or feet incessantly while taking part in activities that lack the necessity for bodily movement.

4. Overuse of fashion accessories to fill bodily voids around the neck, below the knees, or in the hair.

The manifestation of this last compensation should not be confused with the manifestation of another pathology commonly known as "prepubescence" or "tween syndrome", often associated with Bieber Fever or a fixation on Disney Channel Original Movies (DCOM).

It is vital for TSEH patients to feel that compensation proves effective. La Penseuse recommends that those who suffer from TSEH invest in several seasons of 30 Rock on DVD for clever conversation ideas and at least three neutral pashminas to minimize the perception of emptiness in the region above the clavicle and below the jawbone. For any less-than-fashion-minded TSEH patients desiring to compensate with accessories, please speak to La Penseuse directly.

Comments encouraged.

**For the purposes of this blog, self-diagnosis will be considered an accepted and legitimate medical procedure.

a brilliant idea

2010-09-27T22:51:00.007-06:00

(this post was more than likely inspired by things found at hyperboleandahalf.blogspot.com)

chameleon

2010-09-26T00:12:00.004-06:00

I have discovered something about myself.

But first, watch this. Really. Watch it. (Then realize that you were totally fooled by Photoshop. Haha. Suckers.)

I am a CHAMELEON. It's true! I can't begin to number the amount of times that good friends or even family members have been unable to recognize me after a haircut or makeover or after donning a pair of thickly rimmed glasses. It's like I morph into something else, blending into my environment and joining the ranks of unfamiliar faces.

Last night, my grandpa looked at me and smiled. Then leaned over to my brother and conspicuously interrogated him as to who I was. Disconcerted (though not terribly surprised), I stood up and pulled my bangs away from my forehead. At that point, he laughed and said something like, "Oh, it's you under there."

Earlier tonight, I wore my glasses to a party. A good friend started making conversation with me when he stopped mid-sentence and admitted that he hadn't recognized me a second before.

Maybe it should upset me that my face isn't memorable or that friends from my junior year of high school can't remember my name because they associate it with short, dark hair. But it doesn't. Actually, I quite like being able to reinvent myself. I like that I can slick my hair back and wear a smoky eye on Monday morning, then change into a plaid shirt and geeky glasses to assume the role of the tortured art school kid by night.

I like it. I like being a chameleon.

is law school for you?: the lsat and other foul findings

2010-09-18T10:59:00.007-06:00

I took an LSAT prep test today:

Read: La Penseuse can't handle ten more weeks of logical reasoning and reading comprehension. If law school is anything like this foul test, she resigns.

So what IS law school really like? I discovered that the world wide web has much to offer on this subject.

Google Search: "what is law school really like"

Hit #1: www.top-law-schools.com

"First-year students often question whether they even belong in law school."

Hmmm... sounds like the Marines...

Hit #2: www.gradschool.about.com

"Law School is very competitive and requires extreme dedication. Always be prepared."

Clearly, most law students are also Eagle Scouts.

Hit #3: www.youtube.com

"Law School is Like Freakin' High School!"

Thank you, Google, for this tender mercy. This one deserves a link: CLICK ME.

So... is law school for you? (Logical reasoning? Meh. Freakin' high school? Tempting. So tempting.)

haircutcutcut

2010-09-02T22:28:00.002-06:00

As of noon tomorrow, this will be my hair:

Look closely:

annual fall fashion musings

2010-08-27T00:40:00.004-06:00

Ladies and gentlemen (P.S. Are there any gentlemen that read my blog? Do tell...), I now present the second annual edition of La Penseuse's fall fashion musings. The famous fall issue of ELLE has arrived at my door and my mind has once again gone spinning into haute couture oblivion. And the fashion forecast for the upcoming season is... dddrrrrruuummmmmrrrooollll...

Muted Neutrals With a Good Chance of Grunge Interspersed with Prep.

La Penseuse's Look Book:

Ralph Lauren

Celine

Marc Jacobs

Richard Chai

Kurt Cobain and Company

MAC

Tommy Hilfiger

emoticons

2010-08-21T10:35:00.006-06:00

It would be easy for me to say that emoticons are tacky and ridiculous. And honestly, this would be my first thought if prompted to discuss the matter. U mite as wel strt using unecssry tween txting habitz if u feel the need 2 wink via cyberspace. ;). Lolz. I guess that I can't help but feel that emoticons seem completely contrived and superficial. When I read emoticons as part of a sentence I imagine a series of robotic displays of emotion. It's like I imagine someone saying "I luv u" and then suddenly breaking into a big, u-shaped grin for half a second.

And yet I'm completely guilty as charged. I cannot escape the occasional smiley. I have, indeed, winked via cyberspace. So it's not really fair for me to hate on those fools who end every texty phrase with a texty face. I would even go as far to say that sometimes texty faces can be useful. A single winking emoticon can be most effectively flirty (if not terribly original). And how else is one supposed to make sarcastic remarks with zero vocal cues?

Still, I believe that simplicity is the best recipe for emoti-texting. If I receive :$&^)) without a thorough explanation, I'm likely to think that you are swearing at me.

In summary:

:/...?

something amazing

2010-08-05T12:56:00.003-06:00

I stumbled upon this one bloggy afternoon. It looked delicious--but potentially guilt inducing. So I decided to modify it to eliminate the guilt factor. And here it is:

Banana Wheat Pancakes with Coconut Syrup and Kiwi

Ingredients for Pancakes:

1 medium banana, mashed
1/2 cup whole wheat flour
1/2 cup oats
1/4 cup egg whites
1 cup almond milk
1/2 tsp vanilla
1 tsp baking powder
pinch of salt

Mix all ingredients in a bowl, being careful to not over beat it. Spray some PAM (is that an acronym? I just always wondered...) into a frying pan and commence normal pancake protocol. Makes about 6 medium pancakes. (Serves 2...?)

Ingredients for Syrup:

2/3 cup light coconut milk
1/3 cup Stevia (sugar substitute)

Combine and stir in a saucepan until thickened.

Pour over pancakes and top with kiwi.

Try not to groan with delight when you eat these.

it all begins... again

2010-07-17T23:27:00.003-06:00

Say hello to the new Miss Legacy. Yep. I'm headed back to big leagues, folks...

fiasco

2010-07-10T01:46:00.002-06:00

As we leave my car to walk up to the party, I realize I forgot to lock the doors. I dig through my purse for the clicker-beepy-thing on my keys. Can't find the keys. No matter--this is normal. Said keys often end up in the crevices of my purse. Assuming that keys are in crevice, I run back to the car and hit the lock button on the inside of the passenger door.

Mistake.

We are making a grand exit when I realize that the keys are missing from a number of the usual obscure purse crevices. I unload the purse--iPod, sunglasses, tampon, gum wrapper, a tangled cord thing--no keys.

"Hey Mark, could you bring me the spare key? I think I locked the keys in the car." Problem. Mark has no spare key. In fact, the spare key is also inside the locked car. Of course.

I call Alpine Police Station: "I'm sorry ma'am. We only unlock cars if there is a child or a pet in the car. Call Gene Harvey Chevrolet."

Gene Harvey: "Yes, we usually can do that kind of thing. Except our technician isn't in tonight. Call a 24 hour locksmith."

Lehi 24 Hour Lockout: "Yes, we usually can do that kind of thing. Except our technician isn't in tonight." **Expletive**. Then why the **expletive** do you even bother answering the phone if you have no **expletive** locksmith on duty tonight?

4th number obtained from texting Google: "Lehi 24 Hour Lockout... Excuse me, miss, I think you just called us a minute ago." How is this happening right now?

Mom to the rescue.

Dear Mom,

Thank you for finding a locksmith that actually employs locksmiths. Thank you for paying Jan from AA Lockout Services to use his coat hanger of salvation.

Love,

La Penseuse.

qualms

2010-07-01T14:34:00.003-06:00

I have qualms with the Sizzler advertising campaign. I can't help but loathe the part of driving on the freeway that involves viewing poorly designed ads and incoherent billboards. Case(s) in point: Sizzler. Are they trying to be funny? Are they trying to be sentimental? Or more likely, are they trying to appeal to that driver who isn't smarter than a 5th grader (but Tevos the game show)?

Case 1: I Sizzler with Steak. Protein, baby.

Next to the catchphrase is a thicker woman dressed as a superhero. Clearly, she Sizzlers with steak because she looks (and wants to be?) a man. No longer is Sizzler a truck stop for hungry and hulky male forty-somethings. It is a truck stop for hungry and hulky transsexuals. Read: Sizzler is progressive.

Case 2: I Sizzler with Dessert First.

A fat guy wears this goofy grin like, "Yeah, I'm fat. And Jillian Michaels can shove it while I swiftly clog my arteries even more with the help of this fine institution." So the real question: Is this really a cleverly disguised anti-obesity campaign? Is the repulsion factor of this billboard, in fact, encouraging healthy lifestyles? (Food for thought: Sizzler's old campaign was "So Healthy. So Sizzler.")

Case 3: I used to Sizzler with my Dad. Now my... kids love it!

This one might be my favorite. Non-ACT-friendly grammar aside, let's examine the curiously placed ellipses. Even Wikipedia knows that ellipses are "used to indicate a pause in speech, an unfinished thought, or, at the end of a sentence, a trailing off into silence" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ellipsis). So... let's read this slogan out loud (and observe the correct placement of said punctuation tool). Awkward, no? The pause after "my" leaves us anticipating which of this guy's possessions he will surprise us with by referring to. It could very well read: "Now my... Dad is dead!" or "Now my... pants don't fit!" or "Now my... wife makes fun of me!" Perhaps the possibilities here actually speak to some kind of subtle genius... (La Penseuse trails off into a pensive silence)

Conclusion:

The amount of time I have spent pondering this qualm undoubtedly deserves its own catchphrase. Or freeway billboard. Maybe I should Sizzler, too... (Image: La Penseuse in an early grave.)

detox complete

2010-06-22T17:06:00.003-06:00

My roommate at Miss Utah was right... it takes three days of hibernation to completely recover from this thing. I guess I'm technically still on the third day, but I'm living on caffeine and Nutrigrain bars so it doesn't count.

Wow. Miss Utah was insane. I can't even describe how intense it was. It's rather bizarre, because you really have all this down time... but it's not really down time. It's time-to-stress-about-your-talent-and-the-production-number-and-do-your-hair time. I think I got an average of five hours of sleep per day. At least the food was good.

My initial reaction of making top ten but not receiving an attendant position was "Screw this, I'm shaving my head and moving to New York." But after some consideration, I've decided to give it one more go. I'm going to be competing in the Miss Pioneer Valley pageant next month in attempt to get back to Miss Utah. I think I have a pretty good chance of doing better next year, or at least getting some more scholarship money. Plus, I have all these ridiculous dresses and earrings now hahaha. If I bomb this upcoming pageant, I'll take it as a sign. Next stop: New York City.

it all begins

2010-06-14T10:00:00.002-06:00

In two hours I will embark on my Miss Utah quest. It's going to be a long week. No computer or phone access. Rehearsals, heels, curlers, granola bars, and tiaras nonstop for six days. Yeehaw.

in love

2010-06-02T00:25:00.003-06:00

A photo of Doris Humphrey's pioneering dance choreography based on Shaker dances:

j'adore london et love paris

2010-06-02T00:19:00.003-06:00

We begin by the Thames, on a blustery day,
Then off to the Tate, St. Paul’s on the way.
But before modern art, a stop at a cart
That sells Near Eastern cuisine:
Kebabs from a spit and perhaps some falafel,
Soon to be topped by Sedat’s chocolate waffle.
Too full to depart, we rest at a mart—
Tesco’s benches are fit for the Queen.
Well-fed and well-rested, we alter our course
Toward Knightsbridge station and fashion’s true source:
That unearthly haven, with couture that we’re cravin’—
I have not a worthy name to call it.
“Harrods, the Great” or “Harrods, the Chief”,
With scarves of Chanel and gems of Van Cleef.
But the poor fashion maven has pennies she’s savin’,
And a tempting amount her wallet.
We stay on the line and plan to embark
On a Piccadilly train, via tube-stop Green Park,
To the paramount station and home of creation
Of the Eurostar path to Paris.
We’re lucky that France is a catnap away,
Parce que j’aime le français, et je l’ai pratiqué !
We change elevation, then hear affirmation
We’re here in the city, mais oui !

borders

2010-05-25T22:47:00.003-06:00

I'm reading "Catcher in the Rye" when Mr. Bald-head-with-a-goatee decides to make introductions:

-How is it?

-Excuse me?

-Catcher in the Rye--is it worth it?

-Yep. I like it.

-What's it about?

-(Baaahhh--really???) **Various ramblings about mental illness and rites of passage and loss of innocence, blahblahblah**

-Ah, I'll bet that reveals something about you.

-Yes, I'm actually a psychopath like the main character. (Goatee doesn't pick up on sarcasm. Makes awkward noise--laughing, maybe?)

-I'm trying to reveal something about myself, too. That's why I'm reading this self hypnosis book. (Shows me his book, entitled something like "Self-hypnosis: Easy and Beneficial")

-Cool. (Keep my eyes on the page)

-Well, I'm going to leave now. Enjoy your book.

-**Smile**

in case you don't read my other blog...

2010-05-19T11:20:00.001-06:00

Here is the official message for Summer of Service Utah, a program I'm helping organize and implement through the Utah Commission on Volunteers.

YOU changing the world: One day, One week, ONE SUMMER at a time.

Summer of Service is a statewide campaign in partnership with the Utah Commission on Volunteers and the Volunteer Center Association of Utah to celebrate and mobilize people of all ages to make a difference in their communities by volunteering over
the summer. Simply sign up to participate, volunteer your time, log your hours online, and win a Presidential Service Award signed by the President of the United States. The individual in each age group that logs the most hours of service from June 1 through August 31, 2010 will win lunch with Utah’s Lieutenant Governor Greg Bell.

The mission of the Utah Commission on Volunteers, an offi ce of the Lieutenant Governor, is to improve communities through service and volunteering. Visit the website at WWW.VOLUNTEERS.UTAH.GOV

WHO: Anyone!
.KIDS ages 5-14: 50 hours minimum
.YOUNG ADULTS ages 15-25: 100 hours minimum
.ADULTS ages 26 and up: 100 hours minimum

WHEN: June 1 – August 31, 2010

WHERE: Anywhere that needs a helping hand
.Nonprofit Organizations
.Faith Based Institutions
.Community events
.Government Agencies & Schools
.Individuals

WHY: To make a difference in your community and win an award
.Make a difference in the lives of others
.Learn new skills and build your resume
.Keep active, stay busy and avoid boredom
.Earn a Presidential Service Award
.Earn a chance to win lunch with Utah’s LieutenantGovernor
.Have fun and make new friends

HOW: Log onto www.volunteers.utah.gov and click on
the Summer of Service box. It will provide you with all
the details you need to register and log your hours.

HELP: For help finding volunteer opportunities please visit www.volunteers.utah.gov, call 888.755.8824 or contact your local volunteer center.

SERVE...
Your community by volunteering over the summer

LOG...
50-100
hours of service(depending on age)

WIN...
A Presidential Service Award and a chance to win lunch with the Lt. Governor

my special little brothers

2010-05-14T13:43:00.002-06:00

I was curious about my 9-year-old brother's email account. (What could a 9-year-old possibly do with email, other than successfully become juicy cyber-bait?...) So naturally, I hacked onto it and found out. We are in for a treat, my friends. Below is merely one treasure I discovered.

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
pppppppppppppppppppppppoooooooooooooooppppppppppp!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
don't say them words

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
ppppppppppppppppppppppppoooooooooooooooppppppppppp!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
don't do dat

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
poop in a toilet!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
don't say thy words

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
poop in a toy-let!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
poop in a toy-let!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
poop in a toy-let!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
cary is dumb

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
no if you say i am dumb then you are really talking to yourself!! o
poop in u toy-let!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
don't say those WORDS!!!!!!!!!!!!! im serous

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
BURP!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
jojjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
BURP!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
burp

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
BURP!!!!!!!!!!

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
burp

Cary Leavy to John Leavy:
burp

John Leavy to Cary Leavy:
toooooooooooooot

And there you have it. At the time of hacking, I found a draft that read "TOOT". If this isn't the finest example of prepubescent wit, then please find me another cyber conversation that spans two weeks using only four toilet-themed words. Classy.

ti ti tabor

2010-05-10T16:44:00.003-06:00

It's official. I just mailed in my registration for a Hungarian dance camp. I got a scholarship to go and tada!--I'll be headed to the Ti Ti Tabor Hungarian Dance Camp in Seattle during the month of August. Tanchaz, anyone?

mon opinion

2010-04-24T00:06:00.002-06:00

Here it is: Ke$ha is a Lady Gaga wannabe. In every sense--her style, her songs, her lyrics, her persona. It's disgusting. The only difference is that Gaga actually has genius talent. Please compare:

A live performance of Gaga:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gY9GzCN74SA

A live performance of Ke$ha:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdDjMOTL50w

I feel this needs no explication on my part.

come

2010-04-17T00:41:00.002-06:00

good news

2010-04-03T09:20:00.002-06:00

1. My paper is almost done
2. Only one and a half more weeks of school
3. Just finished some dance auditions, and my foot survived (Hallelujah!)
4. General Conference weekend
5. I'm going to eat a cupcake tonight

so close...

2010-03-30T21:01:00.001-06:00

I'm so close to finishing my paper. Just maybe one page more. I can do it. I can do it. I think I can I think I can Ithink Ican IthinkIcanIthinkIcan...

my oscars hangover

2010-03-08T09:10:00.005-07:00

To Carey Mulligan,

You are still my style goddess and girl crush.

To Katherine Bigelow,

Sorry to reiterate but sorry I just and want to sorry say support the troops after and sorry you learn to how to speak.

To James Cameron,

I can't wait until your next cultural phenomenon. Maybe this time the Academy will finally feature a "Not That Genius or Original" category.

To The Academy,

Why?

premature aging

2010-02-08T22:09:00.004-07:00

I think that my injury has somehow affected my legal age.

Today I got a membership card in the mail.... to the AARP.

American Association of Retired Persons, that is.

The letter said:

Dear Catherine,

Make the most of your life over 50!

And apparently I can get an AARP magazine subscription for free.

Needless to say, I'm considering the possibilities here.

just healthcare?

2010-02-08T22:01:00.001-07:00

Three Characteristics of a Just Healthcare System

This essay will not address whether or not health itself is an aspect of justice. Rather, we will assume that the right to health is indeed encompassed by the umbrella of justice, supported by the liberal tradition of rights to life and happiness. The argument now becomes not why health is an aspect of justice, but what constitutes the most just form of healthcare. The ideas of John Rawls, Harry Brighouse, and Michael Barry help outline three fundamental aspects of a just system: (1) its source, (2) its distribution of liberty, and (3) its distribution of equality.

Who Should Provide Healthcare?

Assuming that universal healthcare coverage is the manifestation of the fundamental right to health, we must first address the particulars of where that care should originate. It would be unrealistic to propose that a purely private system would be a viable option for this level of coverage. Based on the current shortcomings of the American system, we see that a capitalist healthcare “market” neglects those who do not participate in the market itself—the unemployed. However, the other extreme of a purely public option has its own shortcomings. An egalitarian system can be bogged down by what Richard Cookson and Paul Dolan call “maximizing principles” in an article on healthcare rationing (326). According to these researchers, the public option tends to rely on principles of utilitarianism when distributing coverage. It is more efficient to offer a package that maximizes the health of the population by an impersonal method of cost/benefit analysis. Cookson and Dolan argue that this kind of system cannot account for differences of preference, leaving citizens generally unsatisfied (326). A more moderate approach may be the answer: a plan that balances the preference advantages of private coverage with the overall accessibility of the public option. We can use John Rawls’ “difference principle” to explain a more complete approach to the dilemma.
In “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls explains the basic need for social equality. However, Rawls qualifies his claim with a principle that distinguishes his approach from the utilitarian leanings of egalitarianism. He argues that inequality may be permissible in a just system, but only “if there is reason to believe that the practice with the inequality, or resulting in it, will work for the advantage of every party engaging in it” (167). For example, income inequalities may be considered just if the higher income bracket is helping to support the lower income bracket—there are still differences between brackets, but all are at a satisfactory level. Thus, a certain level of inequality can provide the satisfaction that an egalitarian system cannot. Applying the difference principle to healthcare, we can combine the private and public plans to establish a system that is both equal and satisfying.
A combined healthcare system would be fair, and therefore just, according to Rawls. A public option would address the issue of coverage, providing adequate plans to those who are unable to access private care. However, to ensure overall satisfaction, private options would still be available to those who could afford more extensive or customized plans. The public option would be undeniably simpler, but sufficient nonetheless. Because both parties sacrifice (either money or quality of care), there is a “balance of power and a similarity of circumstances” that is indicative of a just system (Rawls 174).

How Should Healthcare be Distributed to Ensure Liberty?

Applying the difference principle to healthcare brings up another consideration—how much difference is just? When does difference infringe on liberty? Perhaps an unemployed single mother relies on the public option. But if the public option is substandard, are her children resigned to a life of substandard health? Even if they are relatively healthy, is it fair that they may never achieve the level of health that wealthier kids may? Despite their mother’s severely limited access to healthcare options, the children have no liberty at all in the matter. In this case, the differences in children’s healthcare distribution may foster injustice. Harry Brighouse analyzes Rawls’ first principle of liberty to reconcile this issue of distribution associated with the difference principle.
Brighouse specifically use the lower-class children example to illustrate the potential shortcomings of differences in healthcare. However, he maintains the justness of the difference principle on the grounds of “a particularly strong form of priority” (56). If the priorities of any system remain untouched by differences between parties, than that system does not violate liberty. He writes, “The state should ensure that the quality of healthcare a child receives is not influenced by his or her parents’ income, either by making private healthcare unavailable to children, or by providing such a high quality of healthcare publicly that no advantage is gained by ‘going private’” (57). For Brighouse, the priority is the children. Children have the least liberty when it comes to health, having less control of their environment and lifestyle choices. Providing all children with equal healthcare ensures liberty in the midst of healthcare differences, upholding justice.
In a combined private/public healthcare system, certain priorities must be maintained to claim just distribution of liberty. Brighouse’s example asserts the importance of children as a priority. Moreover, this can also be applied to those groups who have limited control over personal health. Senior citizens and disabled persons should also be a priority in the public health care system. High quality care for these individuals will maintain liberty in the face of differences between the public and private options. The resulting distribution of coverage would be the most just, satisfying both of Rawls’ principles: advantageous differences in coverage among those with more liberty and equally good coverage among those with less liberty.

How Should Healthcare be Distributed to Ensure Equality?

Equality is different that the egalitarianism discussed by Rawls, but just as necessary to justice as liberty. We have established that the application of the difference principle does not necessarily decrease equality in the broad sense. However, we have not established what equalities are necessary in the first place. Perhaps the best way to address this is to address the inequalities that are common to healthcare. Richard Hofrichter, author of Health and Social Justice, states, “Eliminating health inequalities is important as a matter of social justice because health is an asset and a resource critical to human development.” But which inequalities must be eliminated? Brian Barry highlights the rampant inequalities of social class associated with health care.
Barry asserts that the unequal health levels across social strata cannot be explained solely by lifestyle. Lifestyle may be a primary factor influencing health, but the factors that influence lifestyle may not be controllable. Barry affirms that “lack of knowledge, articulacy and pushiness […] have origins in the class structure.” It becomes the duty of the state to tailor healthcare to the differing levels of “knowledge, articulacy and pushiness.” Barry concludes, “All that is needed (all!) is the political will to commit the necessary resources” (75).
Perhaps it is not as simple as Barry claims, but he makes a fair point. A just system would actively attack those inequalities associated with social class by committing resources specific to each class. The public option could accomplish this by including educational opportunities, offering courses in nutrition or exercise as part of the coverage. This kind of resource investment would be unique to the public sphere, tailoring its care plan to those groups which are most likely to utilize the public option. Thus, the public option would be responsible for the aspect of distribution of equality.

Conclusion

Relying on the claims of Rawls, Brighouse, and Barry, we can effectively outline three aspects of a just healthcare system. First, healthcare should be provided both publicly and privately to balance preference with accessibility according to the difference principle. Second, healthcare should be distributed to ensure liberty by providing quality public coverage to those with least liberty: children, seniors, and disabled persons. Third, healthcare should be distributed to ensure equality by tailoring the public option to the needs of the lower classes—the social strata most reliant on this option. These three characteristics may not constitute a comprehensively just system, but they would undoubtedly promote the principles that constitute justice itself.

haha. how silly.

2010-02-06T16:56:00.000-07:00

... And a bit creepy, methinks.

hello miss springville/mapleton

2010-02-06T10:56:00.005-07:00

My official headshots for Miss Utah (courtesy of the beautiful Amanda Castleberry):

My unofficial headshots for Miss Utah (likely to appear as a "tribute page" in the Miss Utah program book--also courtesy of Amanda):

This is my take on pageant girl life.

I feel like it's a happy medium.

gladiation of the talents

2010-02-02T21:15:00.003-07:00

My piano and dance careers have always been at odds with one another. In fact, I essentially quit dance to pursue piano through junior high and high school. But upon entering college, I have devoted nearly half-if-not-three-quarters of my educational career in the dance rooms of the Richards Building. And it was in that very building that Mr. Piano Forte took his revenge.

I was at rec night, dancing my little feet away to some folk ditty, when I decided to audition with a piano piece for the Winter Gala talent show. I leaped my way to room 267 (or should I say room 101... Orwell reference, my friends), whereupon I decided to move the piano to the center of the room for my audition. Now, said piano had wheels, so naturally, I pushed backward on the right side in order to rotate the thing. But in doing so, the whole beast began to tip backwards. (I'm suing you, Kawai Piano Company!) Of course, my noble instinct was to rush to the side of the falling creature to save its rusty keys. However, alas! It was then that it slammed down onto my precious limb, gouging its staples into my flesh.

A rush of EMTs, dance professors, yogurt, loritab, ER workers, and orthopedic surgeons has fizzled down to this verdict: Fractured metatarsals, ankle evulsion, and soft tissue damage. Six week recovery. Boot and crutches.

Bah hum bug.

the damage

2010-01-29T21:55:00.001-07:00

My relationship with pianos has been forever scarred. Literally.

chic

2010-01-25T21:45:00.003-07:00

safari chic

military chic

utilitarian chic

menswear chic

ode to benedryl

2010-01-14T23:36:00.002-07:00

Ode to Benedryl

Thy sickly viscosity hath put me to rest
Thru post-nasal drip and sinuses stress'd

twenty ten part two

2010-01-03T11:44:00.002-07:00

After wallowing in my irritation, I have decided to finish my list of four. So... the two things that brought me joy this Christmas break:

3. One time I went to bed early and woke up early for the heck of it. Not only was I impressed with myself, I impressed my mom. And then I made my bed. Talk about overachieving...

4. My little brother called me and said, "Hi Cath. This is Cary. Will you tell mom that I'm about to go sledding because my friend Wyatt has a cool sled that will probably go really fast? So I'm going to be in his backyard having a lot of fun. Ok. Bye." I then giggled some.

twenty ten

2010-01-01T12:29:00.002-07:00

First post of 2010. This feels epic. I think I should start my year with four things: two things that irritated me over Christmas break and two things that brought me joy.

1. I went to workout at the women's locker room gym at BYU and this ho brought her three obnoxious children with her. It wouldn't have been half bad if the little monsters hadn't jumped on every single dangerous exercise machine in the room at the same time. Not only were my workout possibilities limited, I was stressed out by the 8-year-old boy trying to bench press and the 12-year-old playing hopskotch on the moving treadmill. I was running over emergency response plans instead of getting my heartrate up. Actually, now that I think about it, my heartrate was probably through the roof with my anxiety. Great. Goodbye aerobic body benefits.

2. I saw 500 days of Summer at the dollar theater for the second time. This didn't irritate me--but the 40 middle-aged women sitting next to me did. Believe me. First, they ask me and my sister to "scoot down" so they can sit near the middle of the aisle. Excuse me? We were here first! And then they go on to make annoying comments the whole movie, completely misunderstanding the point of the film. In the final "aha" moments of the movie (you understand that the relationship didn't work because of life and that life is okay and love still exists...) this particularly hairsprayed one says, "Oh she is just so selfish." No! Summer is not the antagonist! Have you been watching this at all? Answer: No. You were too busy singing along with the ironically dated soundtrack and giggling at the sex scene.

Hmmmm... to be continued. I seem to have forgotten the two things that bring me joy. I think I'm going to sit in my angst for a few hours.

phenomena revisited

2009-12-21T11:30:00.003-07:00

You're walking to your 10 am class (and semi-dreading it because you know that the room temperature will be negative 23 degrees and that you won't have cell phone service), when *BAM!* you see that kid with New Balance sneakers and a red backpack. But today it occurs to you that his hair is that same nondescript brown that you have been trying to cover up since 8th grade.

You see him everywhere. You don't know his name or his major or if his grandma's alive or if he even speaks English. But you're guessing he speaks English because he's probably from some stucco-and-minivan neighborhood in Jello-ville, Middle America. Maybe he's a nice guy. Maybe he's a freaking jerk. He's probably kissed a girl or two. (Or not.)

Either way, it doesn't matter because you seem to run into him about 5 minutes before each of your classes. You remember that one time you made eye contact. And neither of you knew each other, but you had this knawing suspicion that you had mutual friends...? The thought crosses your mind now--did you see this guy tagged in a photo? On your second-grade-best-friend's winter vacation album? Shudder. It occurs to you for a half-second that maybe this guy thinks you're following him around. You shudder again, while thinking of ways to communicate that you really never mean to run into him in between classes and that you don't like his New Balance shoes. Or even that stupid red backpack.

But then he's gone and you walk into your classroom. Barely aware of any human encounter. Instantly reminded of your loathing of subzero temperatures and cell phone blackholes.

just finished my last final

2009-12-20T20:07:00.001-07:00

And here it is:

Defying its liberal connotations, rationalism is indeed the basis for totalitarianism. Zbigniew Brzezinski discusses this: “The rationalist tomorrow, if it ever comes, will therefore not be an introduction to a democratic form of government, but rather a stage in further totalitarian evolution” (761). Pure rationalism implies one perfect solution for every problem. It follows that a rationalist government will tend toward singular and perfect institutions of authority and citizenry, guided by a singular and perfect ideology—a definition of the totalitarian regime. Moreover, as the rationalist government relies solely on rationalism as its standard of truth, it necessarily becomes its own standard of judgment. Ultimately, there remains no outside moral authority, only the rationalist pride from which the terrors of totalitarianism are born. However, if such a government can check its own rational tendencies toward political and social totalness, these terrors may be prevented. Humbly acknowledging non-rational truth and higher law will prevent “the rationalist tomorrow.”

Terrors of Political Totalness

According to Carl J. Friedrich’s definition, “Totalitarianism is a system where technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership” (Brzezinski 754). This political totalness is a product of political rationality, as seen by its single party and single ruler. The completely rational system cannot afford, and ideally, does not need competition. But in the world of totalitarianism, lack of political competition results in lack of institutional freedom. All societal institutions operate under the rational eye of the central government. If the aims of the institution do not align with the political aims of the party or the ruler, it is not considered rational. Raymond Bauer argues that this policy extends especially to the institution of science. He writes about the predicament of scientific institutions under Soviet power, claiming that they pose an inherent threat to the Party’s preeminence. Scientific research and experimentation must be altered to support the political goals of the regime. Bauer describes the terrors that follow: “As a result, totalitarian intervention in science must have two prongs: act control and thought control” (143). The methods that arise from the need for such control become reminiscent of the telescreens and Thought Police of Orwell’s 1984. The central government employs secret police to monitor “partinost” (partyness) and to force loyalty through arbitrary terror. Consequently, totalitarian citizens become alienated and oppressed, living in a state of constant fear.

Terrors of Social Totalness

Until the regime can infiltrate the social structure of its people, it cannot satisfy its need for totalness. Friedrich completes his definition of totalitarianism: political power is wielded “for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution […] in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population” (Brzezinski 754). Social control is equally important as political control to the rational system. In theory, a single mass citizenry is the perfect solution to the urban blight associated with a diverse society. Furthermore, it is the most efficient way to achieve and maintain mass support for the regime. And mass support, claims Hannah Arendt, is a vital element of totalitarian rule. She writes, “Hitler’s rise to power was legal in terms of the majority rule and neither he nor Stalin could have maintained the leadership of large populations […] if they had not had the confidence of the masses” (306). Nevertheless, as with the methods of political control, social control in the totalitarian context is accompanied by terror. The regime must artificially create its homogeneous citizenry. For the Nazis, homogeneity is racial; for the Soviets, it is class-based. In both cases, mass killing becomes the most effective way to establish social unanimity.

Rationalist Ideology as Pride

Clearly, totalitarian systems have fundamentally similar methods. Still, Brzezinski asserts, all totalitarian methods “would be meaningless without a justification to induce the active unanimity of the population. Hence ideology is not merely a historical guide” (754). The similarities extend beyond the totalitarian methods. They lie in the regimes’ rational foundations. In each regime, the political and social terrors are justified by their appeal to the overarching ideology. The terrors are conducted with a cost/benefit approach, weighed by their effectiveness of upholding the ideology. From the rational perspective, the terrors represent the greater good. After the facts are considered, the solution which is most “beneficial” becomes the most rational. But ironically, the singular nature of the system contradicts its own rationality. Rational thinking involves the comparison of opposites to determine the best outcome. In a system based on one ideology, the standard of comparison is completely biased. The Nazi regime justifies its Holocaust by the benefits of anti-Semitism. Soviet Russia justifies tampering with scientific evidence by the benefits of partinost. In both cases, the standard of “beneficial” is derived from the system itself. With no outside perspective and a biased reference point, the regime will always be satisfied with the outcome of its “rational” proceedings.

The unfailing rationality of the regime is the essence of pride: satisfaction with self or a feeling of superiority. The Soviets point an accusing finger to the capitalists and the “mote” of class conflict in their proud eyes, but cannot see the “beam” of terror in their own. Abbot Gleason discusses this irony of totalitarian ideologies in context of the crisis of liberalism (34). National Socialism, Fascism, and Communism arise as “anti-liberal” movements, signifying the end of individualism. The liberal democracies, promoting their sacrosanct right of individual rational choice, cannot prevent the outbreak of world war. The liberal hubris is humbled by death and defeat, giving way to a new generation of totalitarian thought. However, Gleason notes, “Totalitarianism became a culture devoid of subversive or alternative possibilities” (35). Just as the fallen liberals had, the totalitarianists become prey to the belief in their own singular superiority. Self-assured, the totalitarian regimes relentlessly pursue their ideals.

Humility as Prevention

Political and social terrors rise from governmental pride. To prevent these terrors, governments must prevent pride. For totalitarianism, political pride is manifest by the dependence on rationality as the single source of truth and the resulting lack of a higher law for a standard of judgment. It follows that the dependence on multiples sources of truth and the acknowledgement of higher law constitutes political humility—the antidote to pride. Michael Oakeshott defends the value of this approach in an article that highlights the shortcomings of modern rational politics. He argues, “Rationalism in politics, as I have interpreted it, involves an identifiable error, a misconception with regard to the nature of human knowledge” (37). Individuals themselves rely on many sources of knowledge alongside rationalism. Humans do not conduct personal affairs solely through cost/benefit analysis. Oakeshott points to history, tradition, and religion as important forms of knowledge. Non-rational knowledge adds meaning and humanity to thinking, unlike the cold approach of merely weighing quantitative costs and benefits. The regime that recognizes the moral value of the non-rational will possess a more holistic form of truth. Furthermore, that regime will more likely maintain a healthier perspective on its capabilities. Sources of moral truth point to divine existence, which naturally instills a sense of cautiousness when acting. Alexis de Tocqueville claims that such is the salvation of modern democracy. He writes, “While the law allows the American people to do everything, there are things which religion prevents them from imagining and forbids them to dare” (292).

Just as Tocqueville observes, modern democracies rely on rational law as the foundation of human rights. However, the scars of totalitarianism demonstrate that rationalism alone cannot preserve these. Only political humility, manifest by the acceptance of non-rational knowledge and divine law, can prevent the terrors of political pride.

i feel like i need to list my woes

2009-12-10T20:02:00.000-07:00

1. pulled hamstrings
2. displaced hip
3. finals
4. zit on my forehead
5. no money

Okay. I feel better already.

caw week

2009-12-04T16:17:00.003-07:00

Yes. We pronounce this "Caw" Week. Cute, huh? It's a little flock of birds getting excited about the most culturally-aware concert of the year.

Christmas Around the World. Come. I'm performing Lithuanian and Scottish. A duo often thought to inspire phenomenal dancing.