Part II: Question and Answer[1]
1. Why is disembodiment synonymous with Death?
A body distinct from the mind lacks consciousness and agency. In this scenario, I maintain that the body is like a machine. But perhaps we can go further. As yet human, our isolated bodies are more like corpses, retaining the form of a live body but lacking that force which constitutes Living. Connection is Living, separation is Death. Roland Barthes illustrates this point in his 1968 essay, “The Death of the Author.”[2] He writes:
As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death…[3] (Italics added)
Action that is a product of direct relationship between agency and motion is the Living action. In this case, the direct relationship between the mind’s decision to write and the body’s simultaneous action of writing captures the author’s voice – the Living quality of literature. We may conclude that action that is a product of the indirect relationship of mind and body is the Dead action. The writing that exists as a symbol of an action is merely the relic of the author’s agency. In terms of movement, actions that embody thought display a direct relationship between mind and body. These actions are alive and the bodies that perform them are Living. In contrast, actions that are merely representations of the mind’s previous thoughts or directions are Dead, devoid of the mind’s presence. Only empty bodies remain after the mind’s flight, and the actions or movements are ghosts of what used to be. The movement exercise of “Ghosting Yourself” is an especially potent example of this idea.[4] Meg Stuart instructs us to create a movement that is both physical and emotional. After a process of deconstruction, the movement becomes a ghost of the original action. In this exercise, we sense the transition of Living to Dead. The movement becomes empty motion, the body a carcass.
2. How do we define space-creating movement?
As evidenced by Gil, space-creating movement is the key to realizing the Body. Moreover, space-creation is characterized by self-awareness and relationship with others. Gil points specifically to dance movement: “Dance operates as a kind of pure experimentation with the body’s capacity to assemble, thus creating a laboratory where all possible assemblages are tested.”[5] Accordingly, space-creating movement is assemblage; dance a method of assembling. Gil continues: “Dance not only puts the body in motion by assembling its limbs […], but dance enchains this motioning over the pure vital movement the body shelters.”[6] Dance becomes an assembler of assemblages, the Flesh that connects organs to a body and bodies to other bodies – a true force of totality. In turn, total assemblage transcends the barrier of skin. Flesh is also space.
However, Gil’s conclusion leads us to question: can other movement forms generate this force of assemblage? Elizabeth Grosz echoes Merleau-Ponty on the matter, writing that the force of Flesh depends on “bodily situation.”[7] Again, according to Merleau-Ponty, we can look at the body as an egg filled with and driven by endless, swirling velocities. If the body is situated in such a way that dilates the velocities, the forces may extend beyond the skin, becoming (and thus, creating) space.[8] Furthermore, if the body can produce such a situation, it can also make space independent of any singularly defined way of movement. The movement may be balletic, hypnotic, organic, codified – as long it allows the body to dilate its velocities. In other words, the movement must be performative:
The performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata […] And these open vortexes in the sonorous world finally form one sole vortex in which the ideas fit in with one another.[9] (Italics added)
Merleau-Ponty shows us that performance is the medium of movement that dilates velocities or “opens vortexes.” In this case, the moving body is the musician rather than the dancer. However, like Gil’s dancer, the musician-performer embodies himself, allowing him to transcend his body-proper.
Part III: Conclusion and Questions for Further Discussion[10]
In contrast to the paradigms of Enlightenment thinking, “postmodern” texts evidence that both mind and body exist as a greater whole. We as individuals may realize this greater whole by engaging in performative movement. Ultimately, individual transcendence leads to collective connection and society becomes a single Flesh rather than a disjointed organism. Embodiment and subsequent realization of the Flesh is thus a preferable existence – it appears an antidote to the alienation and ennui of Cartesian thinking.
Nevertheless, like the swirling velocities within the egg-body, our new paradigm is dynamic and speculative. Keeping in mind the experimental and changing nature of postmodern thinking itself, it seems more appropriate to conclude my text with a series of new questions to investigate:
- Is the (collective) Body a gendered body??
- My obvious Marxist terminology aside, which political regime best suits the Body?
- How are live movement and political participation connected?
- What role does communitas play in the creation of a Body without Organs?
- How can performers extend themselves to influence the ideologies and methods of other academic disciplines?
Bibliography
Austen, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1962.
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980.
Bishop, Claire. Participation: Documents of Contemporary Art. “Roland Barthes: The Death of the Author (1968).” London: MIT Press, 2006.
Capra, Fritjof. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising of Culture. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” London: University of Minnesota, 1987.
Felman, Shoshana. The Scandal of the Speaking Body. Stanford: Stanford University, 1980.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. “Docile Bodies.” New York: Vintage Books, 1995.
Gil, José. “Paradoxical Body.” TDR. Winter 2006: 21-35.
Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Indianapolis: Indiana University, 1994.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Visible and the Invisible. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1968.
Stuart, Meg. Are We Here Yet? “Exercises.” 2010.
[1] I will utilize a question-answer format to explain important themes and terminology from my sermon. I realize that my terminology thus far may be vague or confusing – I intend it to be this way. In the vogue of J. L. Austen, I find that overlapping or inconsistent terminology adds to the performative quality of my writing, illustrating the nature of performative speech itself. In the end, this appendix may only be useful for my own understanding – after all, “there is a fundamental narcissism in all vision” (Merleau-Ponty, 139). J
[2] Bishop, Claire. Participation: Documents of Contemporary Art. “Roland Barthes: The Death of the Author (1968).” (London: MIT Press, 2006) 41.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Stuart, Meg. Are We Here Yet? “Exercises.” (2010) 159-160.
[5] Gil, 30.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Grosz. 91.
[8] Grosz. 91.
[9] Merleau-Ponty. 151.
[10] These are questions that went beyond the scope of my essay. If I had more time, I would certainly address these. I find Elizabeth Grosz particularly insightful on these subjects.
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